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ABSTRACT  
 
This thesis examines whether the balancing of security interests against refoulement to 
torture, as advanced by the Canadian Supreme Court in the Suresh Case, is a helpful 
legal development for negotiating the complex security and protection challenges in 
the post 9/11 era. This thesis assesses the controversial issues raised by the balancing 
approach in Suresh and finds the following. Firstly, by allowing refoulement to torture 
under exceptional circumstances, the Court ignored Canada’s obligations under the 
Convention against Torture and the absolute prohibition of torture as a norm of ius 
cogens. This violation of international law through the Suresh exception was influential 
in foreign jurisdictions. The erosion of the absolute prohibition of torture, in Canada 
and internationally, is not only illegal but is particularly troubling at a time when 
security measures infringing human rights, such as extraordinary rendition, are 
proliferating. Secondly, this thesis analyzes the difficulties of determining who is a 
threat to national security. Terrorism remains undefined in international law and the 
Suresh attempt to define the scope of threat domestically raises considerable legal 
difficulties. For example, it gives rise to the controversial issue of whether an indirect 
threat to a state is sufficient to justify refoulement to torture, and leaves open what 
degree of association to a terrorist organization qualifies an individual as a security 
threat. These debates expose how susceptible the term terrorism is to political 
manipulation and misuse. Thirdly, this work considers whether there are legal 
alternatives to the Suresh exception that could better protect national security without 
undermining the prohibition of refoulement to torture – alternatives better suited to 
meeting contemporary challenges. This thesis concludes that the Suresh exception is 
not only unhelpful legally, it is a highly troubling decision that unnecessarily 
undermines important human rights laws at a time when the opposite is needed. 
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I. Introduction 
Since the attacks of 11 September 2001, the concerns of states on how to protect 
themselves from possible security threats have intensified. As a consequence, this led 
to an increase in security measures and stricter sanctions against potentially dangerous 
individuals. However, these measures cease to be rational when states sacrifice human 
rights, often targeting particularly the rights of migrants, for the sake of national 
security. When such trends occur, we return to a legal question repeatedly raised in 
human rights law: How far may states go in order to protect their security interests? 
The Suresh decision1 was a particularly controversial example of the periodic 
reconsideration of this legal question, and the case challenged previous understandings 
of non-refoulement to torture.2 Canada had granted Manickavasagam Suresh refugee 
status to protect him from persecution in his country of origin. Later he was identified 
as being a security threat due to his alleged involvement with a terrorist organization. 
The Minister of Immigration ordered the deportation of Suresh who claimed that he 
would be subjected to torture upon return to Sri Lanka. The Canadian Supreme Court 
faced the task of balancing Canada’s security interests against the refoulement of 
Suresh to the risk of torture. In its decision, the Court prioritized the state’s security 
interests and declared that under exceptional circumstances it would be possible to 
deport a refugee even if s/he faces the risk of torture upon return.  
There are several controversial issues in Suresh. Firstly, the Suresh exception violates 
the absolute prohibition of torture under international law. The risk of torture should 
never be balanced against security interests, it is a red line states may not cross. With 
terrorist attacks being a common concern these days, states go to great lengths to 
protect national security. It is critical to navigate complex security challenges while at 
the same time safeguarding individuals’ human rights. However, many security 
measures taken by states border on the illegal, while some of them, such as refoulement 
to torture and extraordinary rendition for instance, clearly violate the absolute 
prohibition of torture. Nevertheless, states tried using the Suresh exception on different 
                                                
1 Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 (Can. S.C.C.). 
[hereinafter Suresh] 
2 The principle on non-refoulement derives its name from the French word “refouler”, meaning to 
repel or drive back. 
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occasions on the basis of fending off dangers to national security. But how can a court 
or state determine who is a threat to national security? This relates closely to the issue 
that terrorism remains undefined in international law. The Suresh attempt to define the 
scope of threat domestically raises considerable legal difficulties and exposes how 
susceptible the term terrorism is to political manipulation and misuse.  
To prevent this practice from spreading, it is necessary for the Canadian Supreme Court 
to overturn Suresh at next opportunity, and for the courts of other jurisdictions not to 
entertain the argument of exceptional circumstances allowing for refoulement to 
torture. Bringing the Suresh case back to readers’ attention is essential because it raises 
many questions on how refugee law and protection against torture relate to each other 
and what position they hold in face of rising security concerns. This thesis argues that 
the Suresh exception was not a helpful legal development to solve security problems, 
but a highly troubling decision that unnecessarily undermined important human rights 
laws. To establish this, I assess the problematic aspects of the balancing process in 
Suresh, the negative example the Suresh exception has set for other cases and the legal 
difficulty of basing the Suresh exception on the existence of a danger to national 
security, as this is a term which lacks clear definition in international law.  
For the purpose of this analysis, I adopt a positivist approach. Although one may at 
times wish for a law that is objective, clear, and free from external influence, I utilize 
the positivist approach with an understanding that in reality law is never independent 
from politics.3 All norms result from political choices. However, there is value in 
relying on norms established and crystalized through decades of debate and 
adjudication, such as the absolute prohibition of torture. Such norms have a long history 
of confirmation and support by legal scholars and jurisprudence and have withstood 
the test of changeable political circumstances. In comparison, recent legal 
developments that prioritize security interests, such as the Suresh exception, are an 
immediate and ill-advised answer to threat of terrorism, and are knee-jerk band-aid 
solutions that can contribute to exacerbating security problems in the long term. These 
                                                
3 Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, 1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 4, 9 (1990). 
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norms of the post-9/11 era should not supersede carefully considered, evolved, and 
long-standing norms such as non-refoulement and the absolute prohibition of torture. 
I begin with a background on the prohibition of refoulement to torture in international 
law and a summary of the Suresh case history in chapter II. Chapter III deals with the 
erosion of the absolute prohibition of torture through the Suresh exception. It shows 
how the Canadian Supreme Court endorsed Canada’s violation of its obligations under 
international law by ignoring the absolute character of the prohibition against torture. 
It illustrates the negative impact the Suresh decision has had on other cases by 
providing states with an argument and precedent to prioritize security interests over the 
human right to be protected from torture. I contextualize the Suresh decision alongside 
other security measures targeting migrants, looking particularly at the proliferation of 
extraordinary rendition as an example of such measures getting out of hand. Here, 
states did not rely on measures bordering on the illegal but actually crossed the line by 
violating the prohibition of torture, as the Canadian Supreme Court did in Suresh. 
Chapter IV is dedicated to the difficulty of determining who constitutes a security 
threat. The first sub-section discusses the lack of a clear definition of terrorism in 
international law and how Suresh tried to define domestically what constitutes a danger 
against national security. The second sub-section analyzes the problematic attempt to 
expand the scope of threat to include even indirect risks. And lastly the chapter 
elaborates the question of what degree of association with a terroristic organization, 
without direct participation in an act of terror, is sufficient to declare somebody a 
danger to national security. Finally, chapter V suggests alternative ways of protecting 
security interests without exposing an individual to the risk of torture, such as domestic 
prosecution and possible imprisonment if found guilty of terrorism-related charges.  
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II. Background 
Before discussing the legal arguments in the Suresh decision, I begin with some general 
background. In this chapter, I first introduce the concept of non-refoulement and its 
underlying legal framework in international law. Then I focus on the history of the 
Suresh decision itself: who is Suresh, how did the case arrive at the Canadian Supreme 
Court, which issues the Court concerned itself with, and how it was influenced by the 
political events occurring during the time of the judges’ deliberations.  
A. International Legal Framework of Non-Refoulement  
1. Non-Refoulement in the Refugee Convention 1951 
After the Second World War, Europe faced an immense number of displaced persons. 
Those who could not be repatriated were resettled through the International Refugee 
Organization (IRO). From 1947 until 1951, its program transferred over 1 million 
European refugees to North America, Israel, South Africa or Oceania. However, the 
mandate of the IRO was set to end in June 1950 and the international community had 
to come up with a different solution for how to deal with the remaining war refugees.4 
On 8 August 1949, the United Nations Economic and Social Council passed Resolution 
248 (IX) to create the “Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems”,5 
whose mandate was to prepare a draft Convention on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Individuals. This draft Convention was later discussed in the conference of 
plenipotentiaries in July 1951 and resulted in the adoption of the Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees,6 which entered into force on 22 April 1954.7 The Refugee 
Convention introduces the definition of a refugee to determine who may enjoy the 
protection of the Convention and outlines the refugee’s rights and obligations. But for 
the purposes of this thesis, only the articles related to non-refoulement are relevant, as 
                                                
4 JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 91 (2005). 
5 ECOSOC Res. 248 (IX), ESCOR, 4th year, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. E/1553 (Aug. 8 1949). 
6 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, entered into 
force April 22, 1954. [Hereinafter, Refugee Convention] 
7 Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-refoulement, 
in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR’S GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON 
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 78, para. 30 (2003). 
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they outline the non-refoulement protection and the exceptional circumstances under 
which a refugee may be expelled for security reasons. 
Article 33 of the Refugee Convention is the main legal source for the prohibition of 
refoulement in international refugee law. It reads:   
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in 
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion. 
This article protects refugees, as well as asylum seekers before they completed the 
refugee determination status,8 and creates several obligations for States Parties. First, 
states are not allowed to directly refoule somebody to a country where s/he might face 
a threat to his/her life or freedom. But in addition to this, states are obliged to refrain 
from all measures that would amount to indirect refoulement. For example, refusing 
entry to asylum seekers at the border, inciting non-state actors to force out refugees 
back to their home countries, or to coercing refugees and asylum seekers into accepting 
seemingly “voluntary” repatriation.9 Also, when a state transfers a refugee or asylum 
seeker to a different country, based on a bilateral or multilateral agreement for instance, 
it is still responsible for any foreseeable consequences the person in question faces in 
this other jurisdiction. This was established by the European Court of Human Rights in 
its decision TI v. United Kingdom,10 as well as in Soering v United Kingdom.11 In these 
cases, the UK planned to return asylum seekers to Germany under the Dublin 
Convention,12 which establishes that the first country within the European Union the 
asylum seeker arrived to is responsible for the refugee status determination. At the time, 
Germany offered protection only from persecution by state actors, while the UK 
                                                
8 Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 7, at para. 161. 
9 HATHAWAY, supra note 4, at 317-318. 
10 T.I. v. The United Kingdom, Eur.Ct.H.R. (2002). 
11 Soering v. The United Kingdom, Eur.Ct.H.R. (1989). 
12 Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one 
of the Member States of the European Communities - Dublin Convention, EU Regulation 97/C 254/01, 
1997 O.J. (C 254). Article 8 reads: “Where no Member State responsible for examining the application 
for asylum can be designated on the basis of the other criteria listed in this Convention, the first 
Member State with which the application for asylum is lodged shall be responsible for examining it.” 
Replaced in 2003 by the Dublin II Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003, O.J. (L 50) and 
in 2013 by the Dublin III Regulation (Council Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013, O.J. (L 180). 
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already followed the nowadays-accepted standard of granting asylum when the 
persecution was carried out by non-state actors. As a consequence, Germany would 
had denied refugee status to the individuals in question and deported them. The Court 
clarified that the UK would be responsible for indirect refoulement if Germany refouled 
them to their country of origin. Thus, the state must not transfer these refugees to 
Germany.13 The same was confirmed by the House of Lords decision R v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department; Ex parte Adan.14 
The prohibition of refoulement does not only apply when the refugee will face a threat 
to life and freedom. Through different Conventions the content has expanded to include 
more situations. For example, non-refoulement applies to facing a risk of torture upon 
return through the Convention against Torture15, or a risk from persecution for political 
opinions or religious beliefs during times of armed conflict under the Fourth Geneva 
Convention.16 I discuss these additional aspects to non-refoulement, that go beyond 
what the Refugee Convention protects, in the following sub- chapters. 
Originally the Ad hoc Committee that drafted the Refugee Convention did not envision 
an exception to the prohibition of refoulement but regarded it as an absolute right.17 By 
the time the Convention was being adopted, this stance had significantly changed. The 
non-refoulement provision still held a place of special importance, as Article 42(1) of 
the Convention forbids States Parties to make any reservations to this Article. 
Nonetheless, a second paragraph was added to Article 33 introducing an exception 
based on security reasons: 
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed 
by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a 
danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having 
been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, 
constitutes a danger to the community of that country. 
                                                
13 JAMES C. HATHAWAY & MICHELLE FOSTER, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 36-37 (2nd ed. 2014).  
14 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Adan, [2001] 2 A.C. 477 (H.L.), Dec. 19, 
2000 (UK). 
15 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 4 
February 1985,1465 U.N.T.S. 85, entered into force June 26, 1987. [hereinafter, CAT] 
16 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (4th Geneva 
Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950. 
17 GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 204 (3rd ed. 
2007). 
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This security exception is the main idea the Suresh decision is based on. Usually a state 
is not allowed to deport an individual after s/he was granted protection as a refugee. 
But Article 33(2) theoretically enables it to disregard the prohibition of refoulement 
and remove refugees that pose a security threat.  
Another important provision is the exclusion clause of Article 1F of the Refugee 
Convention. It is relevant in this context, as it also closely relates to issues of national 
security and danger to the community and is used in cases similar to the ones dealing 
with Article 33(2). However, it differs from the previously discussed article in an 
essential aspect. While Article 33(2) applies to people that were granted refugee status 
and fell under the protection of the Refugee Convention, Article 1F excludes 
individuals from receiving protection under the Convention altogether. Article 1F 
reads:  
The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with 
respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that: 
a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime 
against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn 
up to make provision in respect of such crimes; 
b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country 
of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee; 
c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles 
of the United Nations. 
In applying these two articles, states often wrongly blend this provision with the one 
of Article 33(2) and exclude asylum seekers for security reasons based on Article 
1(F).18 This conduct has two reasons. Firstly, from the point of view of states it is a 
benefit to deny protection peremptory without entering the detailed requirements of 
refugee status determination. Secondly, there is a part in the UNHCR handbook that 
creates confusion on this point when it says “the aim of this exclusion clause is to 
protect the community of a receiving country from the danger of admitting a refugee 
who has committed a serious common crime”.19  
                                                
18 James C. Hathaway & Colin J. Harvey, Framing Refugee Protection in the New World Disorder, 34 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 257, 260 (2001). 
19 HATHAWAY, supra note 4, at 539. 
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However, the purpose of the exclusion clauses is actually not to protect a state’s 
security interests, but to exclude those unworthy of the protection of the Refugee 
Convention.20 Many of the highest courts of states such as Canada, the US, and the UK 
have confirmed this approach.21 According to Pushpanathan,22 the purpose of 1(F) “is 
not the protection of the society of refuge from dangerous refugees”, for this Article 
33(2) would be applied. “Rather, it is to exclude ab initio those who are not bona fide 
refugees.”23 The same reasoning was followed by the European Court of Justice in 
Bundesrepublik CJEU 2010,24 where the Court stated that 1F(b) is not related to state 
security concerns.25 The foundation for this understanding can be found in the 
Convention’s travaux préparatoires. According to them, state representatives had 
mainly two aspects in mind while creating Article 1F. One being to avoid the sheltering 
of criminals who could not be tried in the state of refuge, the other concerning the 
compliance with certain extradition obligations. By including the exclusion clause in 
the Convention, states would not be compelled to grant refuge to a person who should 
be extradited according to a different treaty.26 Thus, it is clear that UNHCR’s view that 
Article 1F serves the security interests of the States Parties is not legally sound.  
Due to the similarity to Article 1F (b), it seems logical that Article 33(2) was intended 
to cover different situations, otherwise the provision would be redundant. While the 
exclusion clause refers to crimes committed before receiving refugee status outside the 
country of refuge, the non-refoulement exception gives no reference to where and when 
the crime must have taken place. It is argued that it covers crimes committed either in 
the country of refuge or in another state, but after refugee status was awarded to the 
individual.27 In comparison to Article 1F of the Convention, the exception for non-
refoulement in Article 33(2) includes a higher threshold because they require the 
                                                
20 Hathaway & Harvey, supra note 18, at 259. 
21 Hathaway & Harvey, supra note 18, at 260-261. 
22 Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982 (Can. 
S.C.C.). 
23 HATHAWAY, supra note 4, at 349. 
24 Case C-57/09 and C-101/09, Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. B and D, 2010 E.C.R. I-10979. 
25 HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 13, at 540. 
26 Hathaway & Harvey, supra note 18, at 278. 
27 Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 7, at para. 148.  
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presence of danger to the security or community. Thus, there needs to be an evaluation 
of a future threat as an additional element.28  
These differences between the two legal provisions have to be taken into account 
during their application, so as not to confuse them. If we consider the Refugee 
Convention alone (for the moment, we will not consider the Convention against Torture 
or customary international law), then both Article 33 and Article 1F can allow 
refoulement to torture: Article 33(2) because it allows an exception to non-refoulement, 
and Article 1F because the Refugee Convention excludes certain individuals who then 
cannot enjoy protection under Article 33 in the first place. However, Article 33(2) is 
more relevant for this thesis, as its wording includes an assessment of security interests, 
and balancing those against the negative consequences of refoulement to torture is what 
makes the Suresh decision so troublesome. 
There is the question whether non-refoulement has become a norm of customary 
international law and would therefore give protection to individuals even when the 
Refugee Convention does not apply to them. Two elements have to be fulfilled for a 
norm to count as customary law: state practice and opinio iuris. State practice refers to 
the actual behavior of states while the opinio iuris relates to the “subjective belief” of 
states that their behavior is in correspondence with the law.29 The International Court 
of Justice specified the element of state practice on numerous occasions. For example, 
in the Asylum case30 it established that state practice should be constant and uniform,31 
while in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases32  it elaborated that state practice needs 
to be “both extensive and virtually uniform.”33 However, it is important to note that in 
Nicaragua34 the Court clarified that state practice does not need to be perfect. For a 
rule to be established as customary law it is sufficient “that the conduct of States should, 
in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct 
                                                
28 Id. at para. 147. 
29 MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 70 (5th ed. 2003). 
30 Asylum (Colombia v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (November 1950). 
31 SHAW, supra note 29, at 72. 
32 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of 
Germany v. Netherlands), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (February 1969). [hereinafter, North Sea Continental Shelf] 
33 SHAW, supra note 29, at 73. 
34 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 1986). [hereinafter, Nicaragua] 
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inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that 
rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule.”35 
The second element, the opinio iuris, can be found in the “verbal statements of 
government representatives to international organisations, in the content of UNGA 
resolutions, declarations and other normative instruments adopted by such 
organisations, and in the consent of states to such instruments”.36 This was clearly 
mentioned in the Nicaragua case where the Court states that the subjective element of 
customary international law can be “deduced from, inter alia, the attitude of the Parties 
and the attitude of States towards certain General Assembly resolutions”, in particular 
the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States for instance.37 It is also important to note that the 
codification of a rule or its embodiment in multilateral conventions “does not mean that 
they cease to exist and to apply as principles of customary law”.38 Therefore, it is 
possible that a rule of customary law exists also as a rule of international treaty law.39  
As established in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, a conventional rule can pass 
into “the general corpus of international law” and become binding for all states as a 
norm of customary international law.40 For this, three elements need to be fulfilled 
according to the Court. Firstly, the conventional rule needs to be of fundamentally 
norm-creating character.41 Secondly, “even without the passage of any considerable 
period of time, a very widespread and representative participation in the convention 
might suffice” if it includes those states whose interests are especially affected.42 And 
thirdly, state practice in accordance with the conventional rule has to be “extensive and 
                                                
35 Nicaragua, supra note 34, at para. 186. 
36 BIRGIT SCHLÜTTER, DEVELOPMENTS IN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: THEORY AND THE 
PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL AD HOC CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNALS FOR RWANDA AND YUGOSLAVIA 153 (2010). 
37 Nicaragua, supra note 34, at para. 188. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/25/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970). [hereinafter, Friendly 
Relations Declaration] 
38 Id. at para. 174. 
39 Id. at para. 177. 
40 North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 32, at para. 71. 
41 Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 7, at para. 200. 
42 North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 32, at para 73. 
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virtually uniform" and "show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation 
is involved”.43  
With regards to the non-refoulement provision of the Refugee Convention the majority 
of scholars see these requirements for a conventional rule to pass into customary law 
as fulfilled.44 The non-refoulement provisions in the Refugee Convention and other 
international instruments are of norm-creating character, which has been confirmed by 
various declarations adopted by the UN General Assembly or by statements of the 
Council of Europe, for instance.45 Also the second element of widespread and 
representative state support is fulfilled, as the extent of participation in treaties with 
non-refoulement provisions shows an almost universal acceptance of this principle.46 
For example, the Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol47 were ratified by 148 
states.48 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem conducted a comprehensive study on this aspect 
and also included states that did not sign the Refugee Convention but are parties to 
other (regional) treaties including a prohibition of refoulement. They came to the 
conclusion that about 90% of the UN member states have thus accepted norms of non-
refoulement.49 The third element of consistent practice and general recognition of the 
rule is for one part fulfilled through the above mentioned near universal participation 
by states in treaties including non-refoulement provisions. However, this alone would 
not be enough. A further evidence for general recognition can be found in the high 
number of states who have internalized non-refoulement into their domestic legal 
order.50  In addition, the States Parties to the Refugee Convention explicitly declared 
in 2001 that the non-refoulement provision is to be considered a norm of customary 
                                                
43 Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 7, at para. 200. 
44 GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 17, at 354.  
45 Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 7, at para. 203.  
46 Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 7, at para. 209. 
47 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 31 January 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, entered into 
force Oct. 4, 1967. 
48 See UNHCR record of state parties as of April 2015: 
http://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b73b0d63/states-parties-1951-convention-its-1967-
protocol.html 
49 Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 7, at para. 209. Their study shows that 135 states are party to 
the Refugee Convention and its Protocol, 121 to the CAT and 146 to the ICCPR. When one includes 
other legal instruments with a non-refoulement provision, such as ECHR or the OAU Refugee 
Convention, this adds up to 170 states, which clearly forms a majority regarding that the UN has 193 
member states. 
50 Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 7, at paras. 212-213. 
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international law.51 All these elements combined show that non-refoulement has indeed 
become to a norm of customary international law.52 The more difficult part is to identify 
what exactly is the content of this customary rule. Most of the time, states, courts, 
international organizations, and scholars refer to non-refoulement as it is understood in 
the Refugee Convention, as a prohibition of return to any territory that poses a threat 
to life or freedom. However, this scope of protection has been extended to include the 
risk of torture, due to the customary character of the non-refoulement provision in the 
Convention against Torture (see chapter III.A.2). Whether customary law also prohibits 
refoulement to a place where the individual might face cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment still leaves some room for debate.53  
2. Non-Refoulement in the Convention Against Torture 
In December 1984, the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereinafter 
abbreviated CAT)54 that is aimed at improving the protection against torture and other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.55 It not only established obligations for the 
States Parties, but also creates rights for individuals,56 for instance in the area of non-
refoulement which can be found in Article 3 of the Convention: 
 1. No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person 
to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing 
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.  
2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, 
the competent authorities shall take into account all relevant 
considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State 
                                                
51 HATHAWAY, supra note 4, at 364. Citing the “Declaration of States Parties to the 1951 Convention 
and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees” UN Doc. HCR/MMSP/2001/09, Dec. 13, 
2001, at para. 4. 
52 Phil Chan, The Protection of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: Non-Refoulement Under 
Customary International Law?, 10 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 231, 234 (2006). 
Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 7, at para. 216. 
53 Costello & Foster, supra note 29, at 305-306. 
54 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 4 
February 1985,1465 U.N.T.S. 85, entered into force June 26, 1987. [hereinafter, CAT] 
55 KEES WOUTERS, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STANDARDS FOR THE PROTECTION FROM REFOULEMENT: A 
LEGAL ANALYSIS ON THE PROHIBITIONS ON REFOULEMENT CONTAINED IN THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, 
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS, AND THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE, 426 (2009). 
56 Id. at 427. 
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concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations 
of human rights.57 
Article 3 applies to individuals under the control of a State Party, be it within its 
territory or outside.58 Substantially it only encompasses those under the threat of 
torture, while acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment do not trigger protection. 
With accordance to the definition of torture in Article 1 of the CAT, the protection from 
refoulement applies to conduct that causes severe mental or physical pain or suffering, 
that was inflicted intentionally for purposes that relate to the interests of the state. 
Therefore, there needs to be a certain involvement from state authorities or at least 
acquiescence through refraining from preventing the act.59 In addition, the risk of being 
subjected to torture must be based on substantive grounds.60 This means the personal 
risk of torture has to be found to extend “beyond mere theory or suspicion”61 but the 
threat does not need to be “highly likely to occur”.62 This makes the burden of proof 
for the individual less strict than according to other human rights treaties like the 
European Convention on Human Rights,63 for instance, where the test of high 
probability needs to be fulfilled.64 Furthermore, the general human rights situation in 
the country of origin has to be considered too65 which can give extra support to the 
individual’s claim that s/he will face torture after refoulement. 
The prohibition of refoulement in the CAT is a powerful regulation for two reasons. 
Firstly, it is not open to any exceptions or derogations out of national security reasons 
or other public emergencies, which makes it an absolute provision.66 Secondly, 
individuals have the possibility to lodge complaints with the Committee against Torture 
when their rights based on Article 3 are being infringed by a state. This Committee was 
established by Article 17 of the CAT as an independent institution within the United 
                                                
57 CAT, supra note 58, at Art 3. 
58 WOUTERS, supra note 59, at 520. 
59 Id. at 521. 
60 Id. 
61 Aoife Duffy, Expulsion to Face Torture? Non-refoulement in International Law, 20 INT J REFUGEE 
LAW 373, 380 (2008). 
62 JANE MCADAM, COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW 123 (2007). 
63 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 Nov. 1950, 
213 U.N.T.S. 222, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953. [hereinafter, ECHR]  
64 Duffy, supra note 65, at 380. 
65 MCADAM, supra note 66, at 123. 
66 WOUTERS, supra note 59, at 523.  
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Nations, with the task to interpret the Convention.67 However, it is only possible to 
bring a case before it when the concerned state has accepted the Committee’s 
competence in this area.68 Also its decisions are not binding on the States Parties, they 
are only recommendations. Nevertheless, they are an essential source for finding 
authoritative interpretations of the non-refoulement provision of the CAT,69 and the 
negative publicity of being found in violation with the CAT can persuade states to 
comply with the Committee’s decision.  
3. Non-Refoulement in Other International Treaties 
Besides the Refugee Convention and the CAT, there are other international treaties that 
incorporate provisions of non-refoulement. The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights70 includes a provision in Article 7 that not only prohibits torture but 
also cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. Although there is no 
specific mentioning of refoulement, this article has been interpreted as including a duty 
not to deport anyone to a country where s/he would face this kind of treatment.71 The 
Fourth Geneva Convention 194972 establishes in its Article 45 a prohibition of 
transferring a person to a country “where he or she may have reason to fear persecution 
for his or her political opinions or religious beliefs” during armed conflict.73 In 
addition, many regional agreements such as the OAU Refugee Convention,74 the 
American Convention on Human Rights,75 and the African Charter of Human and 
Peoples’ Rights,76 also contain forms of non-refoulement.77 For the purpose of this 
thesis it is not necessary to discuss all these legal instruments in detail as the most 
significant legal sources on an international level are the Refugee Convention and the 
                                                
67 Id. at 429.  
68 Id. at 431. 
69 Id. at 520. 
70 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 Dec. 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 1057 
U.N.T.S. 407, entered into force March 23, 1976. [hereinafter, ICCPR] 
71 GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 17, at 209. 
72 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (4th Geneva 
Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950. 
73 GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 17, at 209.  
74 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa, 10 Sept. 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45, entered into force June 20, 1974. 
75 American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San José, Costa Rica”, 22 Nov. 1969, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123, entered into force July 18, 1978. 
76 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 27 June 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S., entered into force  
Oct. 21, 1986. 
77 GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 17, 209-210. 
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CAT. However, there is one more regional treaty that is useful for this thesis: the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).78  
The ECHR plays a significant role in the protection from refoulement due to its binding 
character for the European states that signed it and the extensive jurisprudence that was 
rendered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on this topic. Decisions by 
the ECtHR are of high importance as they are binding on the parties to the dispute, and 
also constitute precedents.79 Individuals are able to lodge a complaint with the Court 
whenever they find their rights guaranteed by the ECHR infringed.80 This is a huge 
advantage over courts that are only open to petitions by states, as it improves access to 
legal remedies and makes states more likely to comply with their obligations.   
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights reads: “No one shall be 
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”81 In itself, 
this provision does not directly mention the issue of refoulement, however landmark 
cases by the ECtHR confirmed that this rule encompasses the extradition or deportation 
of individuals. Therefore, sending them to a state where they would face any of the 
described treatment, would constitute a breach of Article 3.82 This prohibition of torture 
and degrading treatment is of absolute character. Many other articles of the ECHR 
allow for exceptions out of national security reasons, morals or public health. Article 3 
does not include such exceptions.83 The Convention even goes one step further by 
explicitly forbidding any derogations to this article even “in times of war or other public 
emergencies threatening the life of the nation”.84 This has been confirmed by the 
ECtHR, therefore states cannot justify the use of torture, nor the refoulement to it, based 
on security issues such as counter-terrorism.85 
This overview of the legal framework of non-refoulement has illustrated the three most 
relevant laws, all of them slightly different. Article 33 of the Refugee Convention as a 
                                                
78 ECHR, supra note 67. 
79 WOUTERS, supra note 59, at 195. 
80 Id. at 194. 
81 ECHR, supra note 67, at Art. 3. 
82 GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 17, at 310. 
83 WOUTERS, supra note 59, at 307. 
84 Id. at 308. See ECHR, supra note 67, at Art. 15(2). 
85 WOUTERS, supra note 59, at 308. 
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prohibition that leaves room for security exceptions, Article 3 of the CAT as an 
absolute prohibition of refoulement to torture, and Article 3 of the ECHR as a very 
strong legal norm with the ECtHR to enforce it, but with only limited regional 
application. In the next section, I introduce the Suresh decision, to pave the way for 
subsequent chapters that will consider the arguments judges used for assessing the 
prohibition of refoulement to torture.  
B. The Suresh Case History 
In 2002, the Canadian Supreme Court heard the case of Manickavasagam Suresh from 
Sri Lanka. He fled his home country and came to Canada in 1990 as an asylum seeker 
claiming persecution due to being of Tamil descent. In April 1991, he was accepted as 
a refugee. In the summer of the same year, he applied for immigrant status but did not 
complete the process, because the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and the 
Solicitor General of Canada initiated deportation proceedings against him based on 
security grounds.86 
In 1995, a security certificate was issued under section 40.1 of the Canadian 
Immigration Act that identified Suresh as a threat to Canada, and declared him 
inadmissible to the country.87 The certificate stated that he is a member of the LTTE,88 
which supports violent Tamil uprisings in Sri Lanka. Based on findings of the Canadian 
Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), this group was involved in terrorist activities 
against the democratically elected government of Sri Lanka.89 Suresh was detained in 
October of the same year when the security certificate was submitted to the Federal 
Court of Canada to be examined on its reasonableness.90 Two years later Judge 
Teitelbaum upheld the security certificate and confirmed that Suresh was a member of 
the LTTE and that it is reasonable to believe this organization was involved in terrorist 
                                                
86 Suresh, supra note 1, at paras. 7-8. 
87 Id. at para. 9. 
88 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, also known as the Tamil Tigers. 
89 Suresh, supra note 1, at para. 10.  
90 Obiora Chinedu Okafor & Pius Lekwuwa Okoronkwo, Re-configuring Non-refoulement? The 
Suresh Decision, “Security Relativism”, and the International Human Rights Imperative, 15 INT J 
REFUGEE LAW 30, 34 (2003). 
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acts. However, he also stated that Sri Lanka mistreats Tamils they arrest to an extent 
that might amount to torture.91 
The deportation process followed and in 1997 the Minister issued an opinion declaring 
Suresh a danger to Canadian security. According to Canadian legislation, the Minister 
was allowed to deport Suresh for security reasons, even if his “life or freedom” would 
be threatened upon return.92 The Federal Court of Appeal confirmed the decision to 
deport Suresh and claimed that a state’s right to expel individuals for security concerns 
overrides the international law to be free from torture.93 The Court referred to the 
Refugee Convention as providing exceptions to the prohibition of refoulement and 
explained that domestic Canadian law also allows for derogations based on certain 
security reasons.94   
Afterwards, Suresh appealed to the Canadian Supreme Court, which decided to deal 
with four issues in its deliberations: It examined whether the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms95 forbids refoulement of refugees to places they might face torture 
and death. Secondly, it looked at whether it is a violation of the rights of free expression 
and association if the deportation is merely based on the membership to a terrorist 
organization. Thirdly, it asked whether the terms “terrorism” and “danger to the 
security to Canada” are too vague; and lastly, whether there are sufficient procedural 
safeguards in the deportation process.96 Ultimately, the Court decided in favor of 
Suresh based on procedural irregularities and ordered a new deportation hearing. 
However, what made the decision so controversial and what makes it the subject of this 
thesis, is the Court’s arguments on the balancing between security interests and 
refoulement to torture. It claims that deporting a refugee to a place where s/he will not 
only face persecution but specifically torture is possible under certain circumstances. 
This has since been referred to as the Suresh exception. I argue that the Suresh 
exception entails violations of Canada’s obligations under international law and 
                                                
91 Suresh, supra note 1, at para. 13. 
92 Id. at para. 15. 
93 Id. at para. 20. 
94 Okafor & Okoronkwo, supra note 94, at 36.  
95 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to 
the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (UK). [hereinafter, Canadian Charter]  
96 Suresh, supra note 1, at para. 2.  
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numerous other problematic legal issues that will be discussed in detail in the following 
chapters.  
When analyzing the Suresh case, it is essential to keep in mind that this decision was 
rendered during a politically highly sensitive time. The proceedings that started against 
Suresh in 1995 were prolonged until the turn of the millennium. While the judges of 
the Supreme Court deliberated on their decision, the attacks of 9/11 happened and 
changed the way states approached security threats. In a response to the now 
promulgated ‘War on Terror’, the US passed the US Patriot Act,97 the UK introduced 
the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 200198 and Canada issued its Anti-
Terrorism Act.99 Many other states followed this example and enacted legislation that 
authorize the curtailing of personal rights for the sake of security protection. The Suresh 
case indicates that the judiciary did not remain unaffected by these policy changes but 
was influenced by them in its decision making. For Suresh himself, these new Acts 
could not apply retroactively, but the Supreme Court openly refers to this political 
context in its judgement, for example when analyzing the threat Suresh’s membership 
in the LTTE poses for Canada: “International conventions must be interpreted in the 
light of current conditions. It may once have made sense to suggest that terrorism in 
one country did not necessarily implicate other countries. But after the year 2001, that 
approach is no longer valid.”100  
Another evidence that Suresh was influenced by the political circumstances at that 
time, is the reference to the House of Lords decision Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v. Rehman101 which stated: “They [the events of 9/11] are a reminder that 
in matters of national security, the cost of failure can be high. This seems to me to 
underline the need for the judicial arm of government to respect the decisions of 
                                                
97 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Public Law No 107-56, 107th Congress, Oct. 26, 
2001.  
98 United Kingdom: Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 [United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland], 2001, c. 24, Dec. 14, 2001. 
Available under http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/24/contents/enacted 
99 Michel Coutu & Marie-Hélène Giroux, The Aftermath of 11 September 2001: Liberty vs. Security 
before the Supreme Court of Canada, 18 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF REFUGEE LAW 313, (2006); 
Anti-Terrorism Act, S.C. 2001, c. 41, Dec. 18, 2001(Can.). 
100 Suresh, supra note 1, at para. 87. 
101 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Rehman, [2001] A.C. 47 (H.L.), Oct. 11, 2001 (UK). 
[hereinafter, Rehman] 
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ministers of the Crown on the question of whether support for terrorist activities in a 
foreign country constitutes a threat to national security.”102  This statement implies that 
the House of Lords, as well as the Canadian Supreme Court, see it as necessary in times 
of security threats that the judiciary subordinates itself under the governmental 
decisions on this matter. This is a worrying approach that endangers the impartiality 
and independence of the judiciary and can lead to the erosion of fundamental human 
rights, such as the prohibition of torture, at a time when the opposite is needed, as 
argued in the next chapter.   
                                                
102 Coutu & Giroux, supra note 103, at 328. 
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III. Erosion of the Absolute Prohibition of Torture 
A. Violating Obligations Under International Law 
In Suresh, the Canadian Supreme Court revisited the old question of how far a state 
may go in protecting its security interests and specifically dealt with whether 
refoulement to torture is a valid security measure. It had been long-established that the 
prohibition of torture is an absolute human right in international law that states must 
never violate. However, scholars such as Upendra Baxi observe that the terror attacks 
of 9/11 formed a turning point in international law. States reacted to this ‘War on 
Terror’ by introducing stricter domestic security measures and by initiating military 
operations such as in Afghanistan and Iraq. This made it necessary to reevaluate 
understanding of various international legal concepts to determine whether acts to 
combat the threat from global terrorism as part of the ‘War on Terror’ were within the 
borders of legality.103 It is in this context that the Supreme Court had to decide on the 
legality of Suresh’s possible refoulement to torture under the security certificate. 
1. Balancing Security Interests against Refoulement to Torture 
At the beginning of the Suresh judgment, we find a passage explaining the core 
dilemma grappled with in the decision. The Court takes into account all the external 
influences that have to be considered and need to be balanced against each other. On 
the one side, it acknowledges the role the fight against terrorism plays in governments’ 
policies and how high the price can be if security threats are not dealt with properly: 
The issues engage concerns and values fundamental to Canada and 
indeed the world. On the one hand stands the manifest evil of 
terrorism and the random and arbitrary taking of innocent lives, 
rippling out in an ever-widening spiral of loss and fear. 
Governments, expressing the will of the governed, need the legal 
tools to effectively meet this challenge.104 
                                                
103 Upendra Baxi, ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’: Towards a New International Law and Order?, 2 
Law, Social Justice & Global Development Journal (LGD), (2001). Retrieved from 
https://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2001_2/baxi/ on 26 October 2017. 
104 Suresh, supra note 1, at para. 3. 
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In the following paragraph, it mentions the constitutional values and international 
instruments that function as limitation to security policies and are supposed to make 
sure fundamental human rights will not be infringed: 
On the other hand stands the need to ensure that those legal tools do 
not undermine values that are fundamental to our democratic society 
– liberty, the rule of law, and the principles of fundamental justice – 
values that lie at the heart of the Canadian constitutional order and 
the international instruments that Canada has signed. (…) [I]t would 
be a Pyrrhic victory if terrorism were defeated at the cost of 
sacrificing our commitment to those values.105 
This describes the Court’s dilemma but in the end the Court did sacrifice its 
commitment to the value of fundamental justice in its reasoning and prioritized 
protecting Canada’s security interests over their obligations under international law.  
As a first step, the Court dealt with two conflicting laws within domestic Canadian 
legislation. According to Section 53(1) b of the Canadian Immigration Act,106 the 
Minister of Immigration had declared Suresh to be a risk to Canada’s security. 
Consequently, she had used her right to issue a deportation order on these grounds 
which make it possible to expel a refugee even if his life or freedom would be at risk 
upon return.107 Opposing this provision, Section 7 of the Canadian Charter states: 
“Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be 
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”108 It 
was the task of the Supreme Court to solve this conflict of laws.  
The Canadian Charter applies to everyone. That means refugees are included in its 
protection. However, this protection is not absolute and is subject to exceptions. The 
requirement for a deviation from the rights to life, liberty and security is that the 
conduct has to be in accordance with fundamental justice. To determine what fulfills 
this condition, the Court relied on a process of balancing.109 The main factors that are 
to be examined according to the Court in cases of refoulement to torture are “the 
conditions of the potential deportee, the danger that the deportee presents to Canadians 
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or the country’s security, and the threat of terrorism to Canada.”110 The Supreme Court 
itself admitted that the balance might not be decided uniformly in every similar case. 
Often the same general considerations are taken into account when finding a balance, 
however the specific circumstances around the respective refugee can tip the scale 
differently.111 The most important aspect when deciding whether deportation to torture 
is an adequate response to fight the security threat, is for the deportation to be consistent 
with the principle of fundamental justice. However, the term fundamental justice lacks 
a clear definition. In attempts to identify what constitutes a violation of it, Canadian 
courts, including the Supreme Court, resorted to describing it as an act that would 
“shock the Canadian conscience”.112 To understand how the Supreme Court performs 
this test of what shocks the Canadian conscience, it is best to look at two decisions 
rendered before Suresh.  
Kindler113 and Burns114 are both cases that dealt with the extradition of individuals to 
the United States where they might face the death penalty. This is a valid legal sanction 
in the US but at that time Canadian criminal law no longer allowed for it. Therefore, 
the Court had to consider the scope of the right to life in the Canadian Charter and 
whether extradition to a life sentence would violate it. In Kindler, the appellant had 
been convicted of first degree murder in the US but fled to Canada. When he was 
captured there, the Minister of Justice decided to extradite Kindler despite the fact that 
he would face the death penalty. In 1991, it came upon the Canadian Supreme Court to 
decide whether this would be a violation of fundamental justice. It took into 
consideration that the death penalty had been abolished in Canada, except in some 
military cases, but the public was torn on the issue. Also, there was no clear 
international position against the death penalty, only a trend towards its abolishment, 
and Canada should not become a safe haven for fugitives from prosecution. And lastly, 
the Court observed that the US followed detailed due process regulations. All these 
arguments were considered in the balancing process and finally tipped the scale to the 
detriment of Kindler. The Supreme Court decided that returning the appellant to the 
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US, even without seeking a diplomatic assurance that the death penalty would not be 
applied, would not shock the Canadian conscience and was thus in line with the 
requirement of fundamental justice.115  
Ten years later Burns dealt with the extradition of two Canadian citizens, Sebastian 
Burns and Atif Rafay, who were wanted by the US police for the murder of Rafay’s 
family. After the crime, they had fled to Canada and were arrested in British 
Columbia.116 The Minster of Justice wanted to extradite the fugitives, but in case of a 
conviction in the US they would face the death penalty. The case was brought before 
the Canadian Supreme Court to decide whether extradition would be in violation of the 
right to life in the Canadian Charter. The Court examined the same factors as in Kindler 
but came to a different result. This time it concluded that the Canadian conscience 
regards the death penalty as unjust and that Canada had supported initiatives to abolish 
capital punishment worldwide.117 The Court admitted that it cannot go as far as 
claiming that an international law against the death penalty exists, but at least there is 
a movement towards regarding the abolition of it as a principle of fundamental justice 
also on an international level.118 Eventually, the decision stated that extraditing Burns 
and Rafay without asking for the assurance from the US that the death penalty will not 
apply, was found to be in violation of fundamental justice.119 Thus, the balance tilted 
in favor of the appellants this time. It is important to note that the Court did not 
absolutely decide against extradition to death penalty. Instead it left room open for an 
exception under specific circumstances. The extradition has to serve a pressing and 
substantial purpose, this purpose has to be likely achieved through the extradition and 
not go further than necessary, and the risk of death penalty does not outweigh the 
importance of this purpose.120 
Looking at the changes that happened from Kindler until the decision of Burns, we can 
observe a trend to forbidding extradition if it infringes the right to life. In Suresh, the 
Court referred to these previous decisions and affirmed that death penalty was 
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abolished in Canada in 1998 and had not been executed since the early 1960s because 
it is regarded as a violation to the right of life. Also, it stated that with regards to 
domestic law, Canada clearly rejects torture as it is forbidden under the Criminal 
Code.121 This opposition to the use of death penalty or torture is a view that has been 
maintained over a long period of time and remained constant despite changes in 
governments and their policies. It reflects where the Canadian public opinion sees the 
limits of their state’s criminal justice system.122 Therefore the Court did come to the 
conclusion that torture is seen as fundamentally unjust and refouling somebody to 
torture would shock the Canadian conscience.123 In addition, the Supreme Court in 
Suresh disagreed with the Court of Appeal’s claim that by deporting a refugee to the 
risk of torture, Canada would only be an “involuntary intermediary”.124 Instead it 
emphasized that it would still constitute a breach of fundamental justice if a different 
state carried out the act of torture after the refoulement.125  
So far, the reasoning of the Court is logical. Deciding that refouling somebody to 
torture would be against the Canadian conscience and that Canada cannot escape its 
responsibility by claiming it is not the one carrying out the torture, is in accordance 
with Canada’s international law obligations. But then the Court went on to establish an 
exception when refoulement to torture would not be a violation of fundamental justice. 
It stated that its decision does not mean Canada may never deport a refugee to a country 
he/she would face fundamentally unjust treatment. Under certain exceptional 
circumstances it is possible to expel an individual to torture. Namely when the 
balancing approach ends in favor of Canada’s interest to protect public security by not 
becoming a safe haven for terrorists.126 This is what has come to be known as the Suresh 
exception.  
Balancing approaches might be helpful whenever it is necessary to weigh opposing 
interests against each other, but when it comes to absolute rights as the prohibition of 
torture, there is no room for balancing. This opinion is shared by Hathaway and 
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Harvey127 who add that a balancing test might open up a loophole for states to interpret 
relatively small problems as a major security threat, which should not be sufficient to 
expel a refugee to where her or his life or freedom would be threatened.128 Lauterpacht 
and Bethlehem agree to this but introduce an additional differentiation. They concur 
that in cases where the individual would face a risk of torture upon return, the 
prohibition of refoulement is absolute.129 But with regards to other threats, they do not 
rule out the usage of the described balancing test. Thus, there is consent among scholars 
that in a situation like for Suresh, where he would face the risk of torture upon return 
to Sri Lanka, security exceptions to non-refoulement should not apply. The Suresh 
exception violates a peremptory norm of international law, as explained in the 
following section. 
2. Denying the ius cogens Character of the Prohibition of Torture  
The previous debate solely focused on Canadian law but Canada’s obligations under 
international law by being State Party to the Refugee Convention and the CAT cannot 
be ignored. In Suresh, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the balancing approach 
concerning fundamental justice is not limited to Canadian domestic law, but also 
includes the state’s international human rights obligations, which can be found in 
conventions, customary norms, and decisions of international tribunals.130 According 
to the CAT, the prohibition of refoulement to torture is absolute and therefore Canada 
is not allowed to consider exceptions to it under special security circumstances. 
Sending somebody to torture is a red line that states long ago have agreed not to cross. 
When Amnesty International intervened as a third party in Suresh, they brought up 
exactly this argument and emphasized that the prohibition of torture is a norm of ius 
cogens.131 According to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,132 
ius cogens is a norm that is “accepted and recognized by the international community 
of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can 
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be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character.”133 
It is difficult to pinpoint when a norm has actually reached this general acceptance by 
the international community. The Court in Suresh suggests three indicia to determine 
that the prohibition of torture is ius cogens. Firstly, the large number of ratifications of 
international treaties that include a prohibition of torture are a sign that the majority of 
states condemn this practice.134 For example, most states have ratified the Geneva 
Conventions, the CAT and the ICCPR and voted in favor of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights.135 Secondly, states never officially endorse torture as a legitimate 
state practice.136 Even if they resort to acts of torture, it is always done in secrecy and 
no state would publicly admit to rightfully using it. And lastly, international scholars 
and international tribunals have confirmed the peremptory character of the norm, such 
as the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Furundzija137 for instance.138 Despite all these indications 
in favor of the absolute prohibition of torture being ius cogens, the Court does not 
deliver a clear conclusion on it. Rather it merely recognizes that it is a norm that “cannot 
be easily derogated from”.139  
In the end, the Canadian Supreme Court came to the result that “international law 
rejects deportation to torture, even where national security interests are at stake.”140 
However, it also regarded international law as not binding in Canada unless the specific 
norms were “incorporated into Canadian law by enactment”.141 For Suresh it only 
looked at the domestic criteria of fundamental justice and used international norms as 
a way to interpret Canadian constitutional law, not as binding provisions.142 In 
conclusion, the Court remained of the opinion that deportation to torture is allowed in 
exceptional circumstances. It is not clear on what basis it decided to ignore its 
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international legal obligations when in previous decisions such as Kindler 
developments in international law were important for guiding the Court in its view on 
the death penalty. 
There are several flaws in the decision of the Court with regards to not applying the 
relevant international law provisions. Canada signed the CAT on 23 August 1985 and 
ratified it on 24 June 1987.143 Therefore, Canada is bound to the absolute prohibition 
of torture stipulated in Article 3 of the Convention. Art 2(2) CAT emphasizes that “no 
exceptional circumstances whatsoever (…) may be invoked as a justification of 
torture”, which bars Canada from introducing an exception to refoulement to torture 
such as the Suresh exception.144 Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties clearly states that international treaties are “binding upon the parties to it and 
must be performed by them in good faith”. 145 In addition, Article 27 forbids States 
Parties to use domestic law as an excuse not to perform their obligations under an 
international treaty. Thus, there is no justification for Canada to act in violation of the 
CAT as it is a party to this treaty. Furthermore, the Court itself listed a number of 
reasons and sources confirming that the prohibition of torture is a peremptory norm of 
customary international law.146 It is startling that the Court refused to follow its 
argument to the end to avoid an explicit statement on the prohibition of torture being 
ius cogens. Instead, it evaded the fact that the Suresh exception is illegal under both 
international treaty law and customary law. There are many voices in international law 
confirming this. For example, Lauterpacht leaves no doubt that from his point of view, 
refoulement of a refugee to torture is never allowed, because the national security 
exception must not apply to non-derogable human rights like the prohibition of 
torture.147 The UN Committee against Torture criticized the Canadian Supreme Court 
for failing to recognize this and condemned any balancing against security threats (see 
Agiza v Sweden).148 By now also the International Court of Justice has confirmed that 
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the prohibition of torture is customary law and a norm of ius cogens.149 This means that 
any treaty or act by a state or international organization that violates the prohibition of 
torture is automatically void.150 Thus, with creating the Suresh exception, Canada 
clearly violated a binding norm of international law. If the issue of refoulement to 
torture comes before the Supreme Court again it needs to remedy this violation by 
accepting the prohibition of torture in international law.  
B. Negative Impact of the Suresh Exception on other Cases  
1. The Use of the Suresh Exception in Canada 
When the Canadian Supreme Court introduced the idea of exceptional circumstances 
that would make it possible to refoule somebody to torture, it maybe did not expect that 
this exception would be invoked very often. But unfortunately, the Canadian 
government used it in several cases concerning refoulement out of security reasons.151 
One examples for this is Dadar v. Canada.152 Mostafa Dadar had taken part in a failed 
coup d’état in his home country Iran and was subjected to torture during his detention 
by the Iranian authorities. He managed to flee to Pakistan where he was granted refugee 
status under the Refugee Convention. Later he travelled on to Canada and became a 
permanent resident.153 In 2004, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration found him 
to be a danger to the Canadian public as he had been convicted of aggravated assault 
against his wife and Canada intended to deport him.154 When the case was referred to 
the Federal Court, Dadar claimed that he would face torture upon return to Iran.155 The 
Minister countered that even if there were a risk of torture upon the deportation of 
Dadar, the case would fall under exceptional circumstances as established in the Suresh 
decision and refoulement to torture would be justified.156 The Court affirmed the 
Ministry’s opinion that the danger Dadar poses to the Canadian public would outweigh 
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the personal risks he faces in Iran.157 But it also came to the conclusion that the 
appellant cannot provide sufficient evidence that he would be subjected to torture upon 
return in Iran.158  
It is highly troubling that once again the Canadian government was willing to ignore 
the absolute prohibition of torture (as discussed above) and that it used the Suresh 
exception in a case in which the applicant was not suspected of terrorism related 
charges. Of course, aggravated assault is a serious crime, but this does not fall under 
the requirement of exceptional circumstances as established in Suresh. There, the Court 
dealt with cases threatening Canadian security. Assault, on the other hand, is a criminal 
offense against an individual that is usually regulated by domestic criminal laws and 
procedures in the case of Canadians. It is not exceptional and grave enough to justify 
refoulement to torture. Unfortunately, the Court refrained from rendering a decision on 
widening the scope of the Suresh exception. Once it found Dadar not to be in danger 
of torture, it did not consider it necessary to examine whether exceptional 
circumstances exist.159 The Court failed to clearly speak out against the attempt of 
extending the Suresh exception from extraordinary national security threats to include 
less severe cases of ordinary crimes. Additionally, Canada’s torture assessment might 
not have been thorough enough. The Committee against Torture came to the conclusion 
that a serious risk would indeed exist for Dadar upon return to Iran and that refouling 
him would constitute a breach of Article 3 of the CAT. Nevertheless, Canada ignored 
its request for halting the deportation.160 
Mahjoub v. Canada161 is a similar case in which the Suresh exception was also raised. 
Mohamed Mahjoub is an Egyptian national who was accepted as a Convention refugee 
in Canada in 1996.162 In 2000, a security certificate was issued against him for being a 
member of a faction of Al Jihad that might engage in terrorism in Egypt.163 Mahjoub 
claimed that upon return to Egypt he would be at risk of torture, as he had been tortured 
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before for when he was suspected of being a member of the Muslim Brotherhood.164 
Once again the government argued that Mahjoub may be refouled nevertheless, 
because of the exceptional security circumstances of Suresh. Here, the Court came to 
the conclusion that the security evaluation of the Minister was not reasonable and 
Mahjoub was not a security risk for Canada.165 Theoretically, this is a good result, as 
the Court refrained from using the Suresh exception and interpreted security risk in a 
restrictive way to not apply it on Mahjoub. However, it would had been better to have 
a clear statement against the validity of the Suresh exception in general to prevent it 
from being applied this freely. This can only be achieved if the Supreme Court 
overturns the Suresh exception in a future decision. Until this happens, it is reassuring 
that at least some Federal Courts try to limit the application of the exception, like in 
Mahjoub or also in Jaballah.166  
Mahmoud Jaballah is an Egyptian citizen who left his country because of recurring 
arrests and mistreatment on the allegation of being a Muslim fundamentalist.167 With 
his wife and children he first travelled to Saudi Arabia and then stayed in Pakistan, 
Yemen and Azerbaijan before finally arriving in Toronto and applying for refugee 
status in Canada.168 During the ongoing procedures for the refugee status 
determination, a security certificate was issued against Jaballah. It declared him to be 
a member of Al Jihad, a terror organization associated with Al Qaida, and accused him 
of having engaged in acts of terrorism.169 The Court confirmed that Jaballah poses a 
security risk to Canada but also that he would be at risk of being subjected to torture 
upon return to Egypt.170 With regards to the Suresh exception, it decided that the 
Supreme Court intended for the exception to be applied only in very few special cases. 
It found that as there was no evidence that Jaballah’s case created exceptional 
circumstances, it was not legitimate to refoule him to a place he might face torture.171 
The Federal Court used a very restrictive interpretation of exceptional circumstances 
and curbed the government’s attempt to use Suresh in as many security cases as 
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possible. It even highlighted that halting the deportation is in compliance with Canada’s 
obligations under international law.172  
It is a good step in the right direction that, in both these cases, the Federal Court 
prevented refoulement to torture from taking place. However, this did not stop the 
government from violating the absolute prohibition of torture. The Committee against 
Torture criticized Canada on several occasions for its flawed risk assessment and for 
ignoring the Committee’s request for a stay of deportation in cases the refugee would 
had been refouled to torture.173 This happened for example in Khan v. Canada,174 
Dadar v. Canada,175 and Sogi v. Canada.176 The government was outraged whenever 
the Committee found Canada guilty of breaching the prohibition of torture. By not 
following the interim measures that were ordered by the Committee it wanted to 
emphasize that it considers questions of deportation to fall under issues of public 
security and their sovereignty and that the suggestion of an international human rights 
treaty body may not interfere in these cases.177 It is not worthy of a state such as Canada, 
that prides itself in safeguarding human rights, to continue to ignore its international 
obligations by leaving the vaguely phrased exception of “exceptional circumstances” 
as a loophole for deporting refugees to torture. Instead the Supreme Court should 
acknowledge the absolute prohibition of torture as ius cogens and clearly overrule the 
exception to refoulement to torture. 
2. The Suresh Exception’s Influence on Foreign Jurisdictions 
The Suresh exception was also influential in foreign jurisdictions. This brings with it 
the danger that, in cases of refoulement, the absolute prohibition of torture might be 
eroded on an international scale, instead of just within the domestic jurisdiction of 
Canada. The most striking examples can be found in cases before the European Court 
of Human Rights where states tried to introduce the Suresh exception. In Saadi v. 
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Italy178 in 2008, the European Court of Human Rights dealt with a case where a refugee 
was to be deported back to Tunisia after being found guilty of terrorism-related charges. 
Saadi claimed that he would face torture upon return. The UK intervened in this trial 
as a third party and brought up an argument similar to the Suresh decision. They asked 
for a balancing between the security threat a state is confronted with and the seriousness 
of the risk of torture the refugee faces which would make it possible to refoule Saadi if 
the threat is exceptionally big. Unlike the Canadian Supreme Court, the European Court 
of Human Rights did not entertain this suggestion but decided that Article 3 of the 
European Human Rights Convention entails an absolute prohibition of refoulement to 
torture.179 
The European Court of Human Rights based its judgement on its previous decision 
Chahal v. United Kingdom180 This landmark case took place in 1996 and established 
that refoulement of refugees is not possible in exceptional security circumstances. In 
Chahal, the UK wanted to deport an Indian Sikh for his alleged involvement in plans 
to assassinate the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on an official visit to the state.181 
Chahal claimed to have a well-founded fear of persecution under the Refugee 
Convention,182 while the UK insisted that Article 3 of the ECHR is not absolute but 
limited by security grounds which would make refoulement possible even if he faces 
the risk of ill-treatment.183 Already back then, before the Suresh decision had been 
rendered, the UK suggested to take the degree of ill-treatment into account and balance 
it against security interests. “The greater the risk of ill-treatment, the less weight should 
be accorded to the threat to national security.”184 However, when there is doubt about 
the severity of the ill-treatment the individual will face, then national security should 
outweigh it in the balancing approach.185 The Court clearly rejected this and enunciated 
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that torture or inhuman or degrading treatment are absolutely forbidden under the 
ECHR, irrespective of whether somebody poses a threat to national security.186 The 
Court confirmed this position the same year in its decision Ahmed v. Austria.187  
Unfortunately, the events of 9/11 gave new impetus to the security exception to non-
refoulement to torture and with the rendering of the Suresh decision it became law. 
Now states had a solid example from a Supreme Court that security reasons could 
outweigh the absolute prohibition of torture in deportation cases. This explains why the 
UK brought it up again in Saadi v. Italy, but unlike the Canadian Supreme Court, the 
European Court of Human Rights remained consistent in its jurisprudence. In the 
following years, the arguments of the Suresh exception would be used in front of the 
European Court of Human Rights several times. It coincided with the political trend of 
limiting the inflow of refugees as much as possible and to expel everybody who might 
pose a security threat. While implementing new measures and laws to reach this goal, 
states suddenly found themselves constrained by human rights provisions and the 
existing case law in Europe. In 2005, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovakia and the UK 
intervened in Ramzy v. The Netherlands188 and tried to convince the Court to deviate 
from the established Chahal doctrine.189  
Mohammed Ramzy is an Algerian national who sought asylum in the Netherlands. His 
application was denied and instead he was to be deported on grounds of being involved 
in the terrorist activities of an Islamist extremist group. Ramzy took legal action against 
the Netherlands at the European Court of Human Rights, claiming that in Algeria he 
would be subjected to ill-treatment or torture because of his alleged membership in this 
organization.190 Four intervening states argued that in light of international terrorism 
and the threat it poses, the Chahal decision needs to be altered.191 Individuals should 
not benefit from an absolute protection of Article 3 ECHR if it contradicts the 
fundamental rights of the citizens of a state who need to be protected from terrorism.192 
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The Court decided not to deliver a final judgement in Ramzy as the applicant failed to 
inform his representatives of his whereabouts. The Dutch Intelligence Service reported 
that Ramzy had apparently returned to Algeria.193 Nevertheless, it is clear that the Court 
opposed the suggested modification of the Chahal doctrine because at the same time it 
rendered the above discussed judgement in Saadi v. Italy. There, the UK had submitted 
the same argument as in Ramzy, and it was rejected.  
Four years later in 2012, attempts to undermine the absoluteness of the prohibition of 
torture continued. To justify refoulement to torture for security reasons, a new 
instrument was used: A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the state the 
individual is to be deported to. This is what happened for instance in the Abu Qatada194 
case. Omar Mahmoud Othman, known under the name Abu Qatada, left Jordan and 
applied for asylum in the United Kingdom in September 1993. He argued that he had 
been detained and tortured by Jordanian authorities and was granted refugee status in 
June 1994.195 When his original permit to stay expired in 1998, Abu Qatada applied for 
permanent leave to remain in the UK. Before this application was decided, he was taken 
into custody according to the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.196 The UK 
decided to deport him after agreeing on a MoU with Jordan, guaranteeing he would not 
be subjected to torture or ill-treatment there. Abu Qatada appealed against the 
deportation order, but in the end the House of Lords upheld the previous Courts’ 
order.197 The claimant was considered a security risk by the UK because in April 1999 
he had been found guilty of conspiracy by a court in Jordan. Allegedly he was part of 
a group carrying out bombings on the American School and the Jerusalem Hotel in 
Amman a year before and was sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment with hard 
labor.198 The evidence against Abu Qatada consisted of a confession by a co-defendant 
who claimed that he had encouraged the attacks and later congratulated the group for 
their success. However, there was proof from medical experts and lawyers during the 
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trial that the testifying defendants showed clear signs of torture.199 When Abu Qatada 
went before the European Court of Human Rights, he argued that upon his return to 
Jordan he would face a retrial with lengthy pre-trial detention and the risk of torture to 
force a confession out of him, which would violate Article 3 of the ECHR and Article 
6, the right to a fair trial.200 The Court came to the conclusion that the applicant would 
be at risk of ill-treatment in Jordan, but the MoU was specific enough to prevent any 
ill-treatment from actually taking place.201 Therefore, Article 3 would not be violated 
by refouling Abu Qatada. 
Obtaining a diplomatic assurance from Jordan is a very controversial idea. States are 
inclined to use MoUs to silence the argument the individual might be tortured upon 
return but unfortunately these kinds of assurances are not enforceable. They are a mere 
promise out of courtesy, not binding contracts. It is also almost impossible to ascertain 
whether a state is abiding by the promise not to torture. If a delegation visits the 
refouled individual, there is no way of being sure that s/he has not been pressured by 
the state of origin to claim that the MoU has been honored, even though in reality 
torture took place. Especially in the case of Abu Qatada, it seems ridiculous to obtain 
a MoU from Jordan, when a few years previously the applicant received refugee status 
because he had been persecuted in that very same state. Also, the case deals with the 
torture of Abu Qatada’s co-defendants during the Jordanian trial, which makes it clear 
that ill-treatment is likely to take place. A MoU such as the one between Jordan and 
the UK is not a valid safeguard to ensure Abu Qatada will not be tortured. It should not 
have been accepted by the Court as enabling his deportation out of security reasons. 
All these interventions and arguments to justify refoulement to torture, be it through 
promoting the security exception of Suresh or through providing a MoU, can be traced 
back to changes in national security policies fueled by the attempts to eradicate 
terrorism since the events of 9/11. For example, in a policy proposal that leaked to the 
media in 2003, the UK observed that if Article 3 of the ECHR solely applied to acts 
taking place inside the territory of a State Party, then the government would only need 
to be concerned with the torture and degrading treatment occurring inside the UK. To 
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achieve this, it considered convincing the European Court of Human Rights to reverse 
its opinion on the absoluteness of Article 3 but admitted that this is very hard to achieve. 
As a Plan B, they suggested re-negotiating the ECHR to exclude an extraterritorial 
effect or to limit its protection by at least allowing refoulement to face inhuman or 
degrading treatment.202 Here, the UK completely ignored the fact that even if they re-
negotiated the ECHR to not include a non-refoulement provision, they are still bound 
by the one in the CAT. It is an example how states look for ways to undermine the 
absolute prohibition of torture. In order to pursue their security interests, they are 
willing to hand over the responsibility to another state and have it take care of the “dirty 
work” like torture to extract information from suspects. This way of thinking is exactly 
what led to introducing illegal security measures such as extraordinary rendition and is 
furthered through using arguments such as in Suresh. It is the task of international and 
domestic courts to curb these attempts by confirming the absoluteness of the 
prohibition of torture, the way the European Court of Human Rights and the Committee 
against Torture do. But the more often states argue there is a need for security 
exceptions to refoulement to torture, the more likely it is that a court may accept it such 
as in Suresh, this may cause a snowball effect and lead other jurisdictions accepting it 
too. 
C. Proliferation of Extraordinary Rendition and Securitization of Migration 
In recent years, states interpreted the Refugee Convention very broadly for the sake of 
implementing their security strategies. Some of the taken measures are verging on the 
illegal but carefully phrased to make sure they still fall within the borders of 
international law. For instance, the definition of refugee, the exception clauses to non-
refoulement in Article 33(2), and the exclusion provisions of Article 1F are being 
stretched as far as possible in numerous jurisdictions.203 The creation of international 
zones in airports, for instance, is aimed at preventing refugees from entering a state’s 
territory and applying for asylum, but this would amount to rejection at the frontier and 
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constitute a violation of non-refoulement. To avoid this, states do allow asylum seekers 
to lodge their applications, however they apply lesser procedural standards for these 
cases of only legal and not physical presence. The results are often fast-track or 
summary proceedings that put asylum-seekers at a disadvantage in comparison to those 
applying regularly.204 Another example is Australia’s Pacific Strategy through which 
certain islands are excluded from the Australian migration zone. Instead, asylum 
seekers arriving there are referred to status determination centers in Nauru or Manus 
Island. Also in this case, Australia took care to phrase its strategy in a way that does 
not violate international law (namely by emphasizing that the refugees will receive fair 
asylum procedures in these territories).205 In other cases, security measures are not 
merely close to bordering on the illegal, but actually cross the line. Examples of this 
include the practice of extraordinary rendition. 
Rendition traditionally described the process of transferring a person to another state 
for criminal prosecution based on a previous extradition agreement between the 
concerned states.206 The term extraordinary rendition, on the other hand, has no clear 
definition in international law207 but became a commonly used expression in 
connection with the ‘War on Terror’. In these cases, suspected terrorists would be 
transported to a foreign country to conduct coercive interrogation without being in 
reach of the judicial review of domestic courts.208 Typically the interrogation 
techniques would constitute ill treatment or even amount to torture, which is exactly 
the reason why some states prefer to secretly let other states perform these tasks. This 
way they can claim not to have broken international law themselves. However, they 
violate the non-refoulement to torture rule, which is part of the prohibition of torture in 
the CAT as discussed above. States are bound by it either through being State Party 
through the CAT or by the prohibition being a norm of ius cogens, which includes non-
refoulement. 
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The first case of extraordinary rendition that reached an international tribunal was 
Agiza v. Sweden209 in front of the Committee Against Torture.210 Ahmed Agiza is an 
Egyptian citizen who applied for asylum in Sweden in 2000. He claimed that he would 
be at risk of torture in Egypt as he had previously been tortured by the security police 
when he was suspected of having been involved in the assassination of President Anwar 
Sadat. In 1999, a military tribunal sentenced him to 25 years imprisonment with hard 
labor without possibility of appeal for allegedly being a member of the Islamic Jihad.211 
Sweden denied his application for asylum due to security reasons and ordered his 
expulsion to Egypt. To free itself from allegations of refouling Agiza to torture, the 
government obtained an assurance from Egypt that he would not be subjected to any 
kind of ill-treatment upon return.212 
In reality, Agiza faced ill-treatment as soon as his deportation began. The Swedish 
police handed him over to US security personnel that had chartered a plane to transport 
Agiza and a second asylum seeker suspected of terrorist activities to Cairo. An 
Ombudsman of the Swedish parliament later investigated the expulsion of Agiza and 
came to the result that the Swedish Security Police lost control over the situation at the 
airport, which resulted in the inhumane treatment of the two men in custody. The 
American personnel that managed the extradition were wearing masks and conducted 
a “security check” on Agiza that included removing his clothes with scissors, searching 
his body, binding his hands and feet, pulling a hood over his head and strapping him to 
a mattress for the entire flight.213 Upon his return to Egypt, he was held incommunicado 
for five weeks and later transferred to Tora prison. During visits by his parents and 
Swedish diplomats he reported having been ill-treated and tortured by the Egyptian 
security forces.214 In 2005, the Committee Against Torture dealt with the involvement 
of Sweden in this case of torture. It came to the conclusion that at the time of Agiza’s 
expulsion, the Swedish government should have known that Egypt resorted to 
widespread torture in its prisons and the applicant was facing a particularly high risk 
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due to being detained for political and security purposes. Obtaining a diplomatic 
assurance was not a valid means to protect Agiza from torture. It lacks a mechanism of 
enforcement and does not suffice to relieve Sweden from its responsibility. Therefore, 
the refoulement of Agiza by Sweden was a violation of the absolute prohibition of 
torture of Article 3 CAT.215  
Unfortunately, Agiza does not stand alone but is just one in a long list of extraordinary 
rendition cases. A striking case was the extraordinary rendition of Maher Arar. Arar is 
a Canadian citizen who had left his country of origin Syria at the age of 17. After many 
years of living and working in Canada with his wife and two children, he passed 
through JFK airport in the US on his way home from a trip to Tunis. There he was 
detained for being suspected of having connections to a member of a terrorist 
organization. Against his will he was transported to Syria where he was held in an 
underground cell for one year and subjected to horrific torture. Despite the fact that the 
US had obtained an assurance from Syria beforehand to guarantee Arar’s safety.216 The 
Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher 
Arar found that there is no evidence that Arar ever committed a criminal offence, nor 
that he might be a security threat to Canada. Nevertheless, Canada did not effectively 
try to obtain Arar’s release from US/Syrian custody and failed to protect its citizen 
from unlawful extraordinary rendition.217 
Several European states have been involved in extraordinary rendition by cooperating 
with the US Central Intelligence Agency. They either helped by detaining individuals 
and handing them over to the CIA for rendition, or by allowing the US to operate in 
secret detention centers on their territory. Some examples for these incidents can be 
found in the database of the European Court of Human Rights: El-Masri v. The former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Al-Nashiri v. Poland, Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. 
Poland, Nasr and Ghali v. Italy, Al Nashiri v. Romania and Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania. 
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The last two cases are not yet decided, but in all others the Court came to the conclusion 
that the states violated Article 3 ECHR and other articles.218  
These cases of extraordinary rendition are examples of how measures, taken in the 
name of security, can very easily get out of hand. There is no doubt that extraordinary 
rendition violates international law, but states continue to defy the prohibition of torture 
by conducting it in secret or by claiming that a diplomatic assurance is enough to 
whitewash them from any allegations of (indirectly) using torture. The Committee 
Against Torture tries to keep governments in check and condemns states’ participation 
in refoulement to torture in its decisions. Other institutions follow suit. For example, 
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights stated in one of its reports that 
practices like extraordinary rendition amount to a violation of the principle of non-
refoulement and are a violation of Article 3 of the CAT and also Article 7 of the 
ICCPR.219 Regrettably, the decisions of these treaty and intergovernmental bodies are 
not enforceable and depend on States Parties’ willingness to conform to them. 
Therefore, it is up to domestic courts or regional courts like the European Court of 
Human Rights that render binding judgements to ensure governments and parliaments 
will not make executive orders or enact legislation that violate non-refoulement to 
torture. In their decisions, they set the boundaries of how far states may go when they 
balance security interests against refoulement to torture and confirm that the absolute 
prohibition of torture is a red line that may not be overstepped. This is why decisions 
like Suresh are so troublesome. By introducing a vaguely formulated exception for 
when refoulement to torture is possible, it erodes the absolute prohibition of torture and 
leaves a loophole for states to justify increasingly harsh security measures at a time 
when such measures are proliferating. To prevent this idea from spreading it is 
necessary to bring the problematic aspects of the Suresh exception back to attention 
and to ensure that other courts will not use it. Furthermore, it would be important for 
the Canadian Supreme Court to overturn the Suresh decision to reestablish consistency 
in its case law and with Canada’s international obligations.  
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IV. How to Determine Who Constitutes a Security Threat? 
The Suresh exception was built on the idea that threat to a state’s security can justify 
refoulement to torture. But how can this drastic infringement of human rights be based 
on such a vague term? What constitutes a security threat is not easily determinable and 
varies from country to country and on the international level. Article 33(2) of the 
Refugee Convention states, that posing a “danger to the security” of the asylum 
granting country, renders the prohibition of refoulement inapplicable to the individual 
in question.220 Unfortunately, there is no clear definition in the Convention of which 
acts would constitute a danger. The travaux préparatoires indicate that the delegates at 
the Conference of Plenipotentiaries had persons in mind who would enter the host state 
as refugees and then carry out activities against it on behalf of a foreign power.221 This 
idea of security threats to justify refoulement has been adopted into domestic 
legislations, as for example through the security certificate mechanism in Canada. In 
Suresh, the court determined that Suresh’s fundraising activity for the Tamil Tigers in 
Sri Lanka constitutes a danger to the security of Canada and thus it is possible to deport 
him.222  
With regards to these findings several problematic issues arise. Firstly, there is no clear 
definition of the term “danger to national security”.  Most states use it synonymous 
with the involvement in terrorism but this does not help to clarify the situation at all as 
there is no agreement concerning the definition of terrorism. Secondly, the Canadian 
Supreme Court might have gone too far in declaring Suresh a threat to Canadian 
security if the Tamil Tigers only operate in Sri Lanka. This leads to the discussion 
whether there has to be a direct threat to a state’s security or whether an indirect threat 
suffices. And thirdly, there is the question to what degree an individual has to be 
associated with a terrorist organization, without being actively involved in any terrorist 
acts, to be labelled a terrorist.  
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A. The Unclear Definition of Terrorism 
A common problem with security issues is the lack of a clear, commonly accepted, 
definition of what exactly constitutes a threat to national security, as well as of the term 
terrorism. Nevertheless, most states frequently use these expressions in their laws and 
judgements, especially in the legislation enacted after 9/11.223 In Suresh, the Supreme 
Court analyzed whether “terrorism” and “danger to the security of Canada” are 
unconstitutionally imprecise terms.224 It came to the conclusion that they are not too 
vague as it is possible to interpret these phrases by looking at norms of international 
law.225 But in fact, international law does not provide us with a precise answer either.  
The first attempts to codify the crime of terrorism took place in 1937. Under the League 
of Nations states met to discuss a Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of 
Terrorism. Here they defined terrorism as “criminal acts directed against a State and 
intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a 
group of persons, or the general public.” This attempt for creating a convention was 
stopped short by the outbreak of the Second World War which led to the dissolving of 
the League of Nations. After the war, between 1968 and 1972, incidents like the attack 
and hostage taking during the Munich Olympics and a series of aircraft hijackings 
brought states together again to discuss an international approach against terrorism.226  
The US introduced the draft Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism to the United 
Nations in 1972 but it was ultimately rejected, as states failed to come to an agreement 
on the exact definition of terrorism. Instead, they have issued several resolutions 
condemning all acts of terrorism and resorted to concluding agreements outlawing 
specific acts related to terrorism without including an all-encompassing definition.227 
As of today, the international community has agreed upon nineteen international legal 
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instruments to combat certain terrorist acts.228 This way it was possible to avoid the 
disputed issues and guarantee a widespread support of these treaties.229 
In order to have a general definition of terrorism, there would need to be a clear 
agreement on several elements: the perpetrators, the victim, the type of act qualifying 
as terrorism, the motive behind it and the place and time it occurs.230 Some of these 
elements, however, have been cause for disagreement between states, which is the 
reason why no universal definition of terrorism has been adopted in an international 
treaty yet. The most contentious issue is who can be the perpetrator of a terrorist act. 
Originally, terrorism referred to acts of terror committed by states against their citizens 
as a form of state control, for example during the Jacobins’ “Reign of Terror” after the 
French Revolution.231  Over time the focus shifted and also non-state actors were 
identified as committing terrorist acts. For example, the Bolshevik revolution in Russia 
was viewed as being run by terrorists. Also, the assassination of Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand in 1914 by ethnic separatists, which started the First World War, was 
considered terrorism. In the 1940s, Jewish extremists aiming at Israel’s independence 
as a Jewish state assassinated the British politician Lord Moynes, the UN mediator 
Count Bernadotte, and executed a bombing attack on the King David Hotel in 
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Jerusalem. All these incidents were carried out by non-state actors, which showed that 
terrorism was not limited to being exercised by states.232  
During the Cold War, the international community was split into two factions on this 
issue. The US and the USSR both secretly supported revolutionary movements aimed 
at overthrowing their respective opponent. 233 They feared that this meddling in the 
internal affairs of other states would be labelled as terrorism if the definition was to 
include acts by states. Therefore, they opposed the inclusion of states as possible 
perpetrators, while those countries at the receiving end of this interference were in favor 
of qualifying these acts as terrorism. At the same time, the Third World was struggling 
to free itself from colonial rule and to fight for every nation’s right to self-
determination. This right was successfully included in Article 1 of the ICCPR in 1966 
and in the Declaration of Principles of International Law Governing Friendly Relations 
in 1970234. When it came to the question of including the conduct of non-state actors 
in the definition of terrorism, the states that had been affected by colonial rule were 
worried that the fight for national liberation could be qualified as terrorism.235 Thus, 
they wished for a clear exclusion of acts related to the right to self-determination, while 
the colonial states had an interest in refusing this distinction in order to label any 
rebellious attacks against their rule as terrorism.  
Other elements of the definition of terrorism were also subject of discussion. For 
example, it needs to be determined whether there are any limitations on the targets of 
terrorist attacks. Who is the enemy of terrorism? Does it refer to attacks against state 
institutions and its personnel, or does it target society and refers to violence against 
civilians?236 Do only acts which cause serious bodily harm to a large group of civilians 
count as terrorism, or is damage to property sufficient to qualify a crime as terrorism? 
There are no straightforward answers to these questions and the Conventions on 
                                                
232 Id. at 2.  
233 Zeidan, supra note 234, at 495. 
234 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,  
G.A. Res. 2625, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/5217 at 121 (1970). 
235 Aiken, supra note 230, at 56. 
236 Cyrille Begorre-Bret, The Definition of Terrorism and the Challenge of Relativism, 27 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1987, 1989 (2006). 
  45 
terrorist related acts differ on these points.237 Apart from these objective elements of 
the crime of terrorism, states also have to agree on the subjective aspects of it. Terrorist 
attacks differ from ordinary crimes because there is a certain motivation behind it. 
Sometimes the attackers try to coerce the leaders of a state into acting a specific way.238 
In other occasions the aim is to take revenge for certain political acts by the states or to 
spread fear among the population. It lies upon the international community to decide 
in how far a certain motivation is required to fulfill the elements of the crime of 
terrorism. 
Theoretically, it should be possible to find an agreement on all these elements in order 
to create a general definition of terrorism. However, the problem in this context are the 
political interests of the states involved that influence their decision making. Every 
state prefers to shape the definition of terrorism in a way that ensures its own conduct 
will not fall under the definition but the acts of the groups or states they consider their 
opponents will.239 The danger with such a highly political concept like terrorism is that 
it can easily be abused to delegitimize the political opponents of a state and that it can 
be used to stigmatize and morally judge certain groups.240 Therefore, the stakes are 
high with regards to finding a general definition. There must not be any artificial 
distinctions between certain perpetrators in order to avoid creating double standards. 
But at the same time, it needs to consider certain struggles that should not fall under 
the definition of terrorism as they are a form of legitimate violence, such as the right to 
self-determination or the right to self-defense. A rebellion against a cruel dictator, for 
instance, can be seen as a struggle for freedom or as a terrorist attack against a rightful 
government. The international law scholar Ben Saul described the essence of the 
problem: “There are no clean lines between terrorism and other forms of political 
violence, and the debate about defining terrorism is also a debate about the 
classification of political violence in all its myriad forms: riot, revolt, rebellion, war, 
conflict, uprising, revolution, subversion, intervention, guerilla warfare, and so on.”241  
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These underlying political motives, which states bring to the bargaining table, stand in 
the way of finding a definition of terrorism that fulfills the requirement of the legal 
discourse of being precise, objective and certain enough.242 
The non-existence of a universal definition of terrorism leaves states plenty of room to 
determine for themselves what they consider a terrorist act. As a consequence, no two 
anti-terrorism law look exactly the same as states opt to use the term terrorism in 
different ways.243 The UK, for instance, opted for a very broad domestic definition and 
considers every individual to be a terrorist who has links to a terrorist group through 
supporting or assisting it.244 In the US, supporting somebody who plans to commit a 
terrorist act through material support or funding, counts as personally engaging in 
terrorist activity.245 Often states even use varying definitions in different legal fields 
within their domestic law.246 This increases the fragmentation of the terrorism 
definition and shows how far we are from developing a global consensus if there is not 
even a uniform definition of the term on a national level. For example, in Canada 
Section 19 of the Immigration Act refers to the term terrorism as one of the reasons a 
person would be inadmissible in Canada and refugee status would be denied.247 
However, the Immigration Act does not include a definition of what acts exactly would 
fall under the expression “engage in terrorism”. 248  
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the Canadian Supreme Court had to deal 
with this problem in Suresh as the security certificate for Suresh’s deportation was 
based on precisely the accusation of Suresh engaging in terrorism. The Court did not 
attempt to provide a general definition of terrorism and instead referred to General 
Assembly Resolution 54/109 from 1999 which adopted the International Convention 
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. It defined terrorism as a crime 
falling in the scope of one of nine treaties annexed to the resolution that dealt with the 
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illegality of specific terrorist acts.249 From this the Court deducted that terrorism in the 
Immigration Act shall mean any “act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury 
to a civilian […] when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate 
a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to 
abstain from doing any act”.250 According to the Court, this would provide enough 
information on how to adjudicate cases of terrorism. Therefore, it declared the term 
terrorism precise enough to be constitutional.251  
It is peculiar that in this context the Court relied on international law, more specifically 
the above mentioned General Assembly Resolution, to determine that the term 
terrorism is not too vague. As I have illustrated in this chapter, the term terrorism is 
inherently vague and lacks a clear definition in international law. It is susceptible to 
being manipulated for political reasons, a fact that the Court acknowledged in in 
Suresh.252 Furthermore, when it came to the absolute prohibition of torture, the same 
Court refused to resort to international law in its judgement. It ignored the fact that 
Canada is bound to the CAT as it ratified the Convention. Instead, it only accepted 
domestic law as basis to examine the legality of refoulement to torture. Following this 
logic, the Court should have had only considered the Immigration Act in its 
interpretation, which does not provide a definition of terrorism that would make it 
possible to clearly qualify Suresh’s behavior as engaging in such acts. A strong and 
well-established provision of ius cogens character like the absolute prohibition of 
torture was not enough for the Court to declare the illegality of refouling somebody to 
torture. But at the same time the vague and unclear definition of terrorism in 
international law was sufficient to trigger the refoulement of Suresh.  
As long as there is no clear definition of terrorism and exact guidelines how to qualify 
someone’s behavior as falling under it, any law dependent on it is prone to 
manipulation and to be used for disposing of political opponents. Measures that 
infringe essential human rights, like refoulement to torture, must not be based on such 
an imprecise term. Due to its vagueness, it is not clear how far governments and courts 
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may go in interpreting it. This can become problematic in the application of the law, as 
has been shown in Suresh with regards to two issues: Can a threat against another 
country indirectly constitute a threat to Canada’s security and thus qualify as an act of 
terrorism? And what degree of association to a terrorist organization is required to label 
Suresh as a terrorist and justify his refoulement? 
B. Direct or Indirect Threats  
The security certificate against Suresh regarded him as a danger to national security for 
being a fundraiser for the World Tamil Movement, which is associated with the 
LTTE.253 It was based on the opinion of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service that 
the LTTE was a terrorist organization, although it operates only in Sri Lanka and its 
purpose is to support the Tamils in the ongoing civil war.254 How can the LTTE be a 
threat to Canada’s security if its operations are limited to the domestic armed conflict 
in Sri Lanka?   
The Canadian Supreme Court accepted that the most qualified refugee scholars are of 
the opinion that there needs to be a direct connection between the terrorist act and the 
security of the host country. Also, the travaux préparatoires of the Refugee Convention 
suggest that threats to the security of another state are not sufficient to trigger 
refoulement.255 However, the Court claimed that after the events of 2001 this is no 
longer accurate and indicated that an indirect threat is already enough to endanger 
Canada’s security, as terrorism is a worldwide phenomenon.256 It concluded that there 
“must be a real and serious possibility of adverse effect to Canada. But the threat need 
not be direct; rather it may be grounded in distant events that indirectly have a real 
possibility of harming Canadian security.”257  
Several issues arise from this statement. As Lauterpacht and Bethlehem already 
established, interpreting the Refugee Convention’s exception to non-refoulement so 
generously that possible threats to other countries or the international community 
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would suffice, is inconsistent with the purpose of this exception.258 Provisions like 
Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention were introduced to allow countries of refuge 
to return refugees that directly threaten states’ security and population. There is 
consensus between the refugee law scholars Bruin, Wouters, Hathaway, and Harvey, 
that it was not right for the Court to simply assume that there might be “adverse 
repercussions” for Canada through the individual’s behavior to support a terrorist group 
abroad, but instead Article 33(2) would require a clear proof of a negative impact on 
Canada’s international relations or welfare.259 Secondly, threats to other states can be 
dealt with through other means, less extreme than refoulement to torture. Suspects can 
be detained and prosecuted in front of domestic courts to establish their involvement 
in terrorist acts. Deporting a refugee such as Suresh would actually increase the danger 
to Canada. The conflict he is allegedly involved in so far only takes place in Sri Lanka 
between the government and the Tamil minority. If Canada interferes by refouling a 
refugee to torture, it is taking a side in this conflict. Returning rebel fighters to Sri 
Lanka, where they had been persecuted and tortured, is equal to officially opposing the 
LTTE, which as a consequence might choose Canada as a target of its operations to 
take revenge. In this sense, the state’s security would be better protected through 
keeping Suresh in Canadian control and prosecuting him than by resorting to 
refoulement.260 Thirdly, the Court failed to mention how exactly Suresh poses an 
indirect threat to Canada. There were no explanations in the judgement on how the 
situation in Sri Lanka, and Suresh’s involvement in it, will cause serious harm to his 
country of refuge. It is not very likely that any armed attacks will be carried out against 
the Canadian population or its democratic institutions. Therefore, the fundraising 
activities of Suresh are far from constituting a “real and serious possibility of adverse 
effect to Canada”,261 which the Court had asked for. 
All these considerations do not only apply to Suresh in specific, but are relevant for all 
cases of refoulement based on security reasons. The Canadian Supreme Court raised a 
valid point in claiming that the security interdependence of states can cause events in 
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one country to have negative effects on another country.262 When assessing the threat 
emanating from an asylum seeker or refugee, courts will inevitably face the question 
of how direct the danger to the country of refuge needs to be in order to justify a 
deportation. Even though governments might show a tendency to interpret the concept 
of threat widely to include indirect threats, the above described counter-arguments still 
apply. Classifying a threat against another country as sufficient to justify refoulement, 
is against the purpose of Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention. It is necessary to 
provide adequate evidence that an individual’s behavior has a direct negative impact 
on the security of the country of refuge, only then the exception to non-refoulement 
may apply (if no other issues, such as a risk of torture upon return, stand in the way).263  
The Canadian Supreme Court’s attempt to broaden the application of Article 33(2) of 
the Refugee Convention to include indirect threats to a state, mirrors the general trend 
of expanding the exclusion clauses in order to exclude terrorists from refugee 
protection.264 Article 1F of the Refugee Convention originally does not include the term 
terrorism.265 However, already in 1997 the General Assembly passed a resolution that 
created a link between refugees and the fight against terrorism. It asked states to “take 
appropriate measures in conformity with the relevant provisions of national and 
international law […] before granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring that 
the asylum-seeker has not participated in terrorist acts.”266 Also it confirmed that acts 
of terrorism are “contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.”267 
The exclusion grounds in Article 1F are an exhaustive enumeration and no further 
reasons can be added.268  Thus, states try to fit terrorist acts under the existing 
categories. A terrorist can be excluded under Article 1F(a) if his acts amount to a crime 
against peace, a war crime or a crime against humanity, as defined in international 
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instruments such as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.269 Sub-
section (b) excludes individuals who have committed a serious non-political crime 
outside the country of refuge prior to admission. This ground has been cause for debate 
in the international community. It has been argued that a terrorist might be able to 
escape this exclusion clause by claiming s/he had political motives for their crime.270 
However, there are some additional requirements to be fulfilled to benefit from this 
excuse. The crime has to be committed out of political motives, aimed at changing the 
political situation in a state, and has to be proportionate. The last requirement is where 
acts of terrorism would fail the test. Acts of atrocious nature or highly disproportionate 
crimes do not qualify as political crimes.271 Therefore, acts of terrorism might fall under 
this exclusion ground if the crime is serious enough. The last category, 1F(c), leaves 
the most room for interpretation. It excludes individuals who have been guilty of acts 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. There are countless acts 
which could be contrary to the purposes of the United Nations, for example violations 
of human rights by policy makers or individuals who participated in persecution. Also, 
the UN made it its goal to fight against drug trafficking, to promote democracy, and to 
oppose colonialism, to only name a few. Any person acting against these purposes 
could fall under this exclusion clause.272 The aforementioned General Assembly 
Resolution opened the door for states to use 1F(c) to exclude anyone suspected of 
terrorism. Indeed, there is a clear trend towards frequently referring to this article with 
regards to anti-terrorism measures,273 which now also makes the exclusion clauses 
more susceptible to abuse by governments to target opposition groups.274 
There are three points of critique against such developments. Firstly, it created the 
impression that refugee law and terrorism are inevitably connected, whereas entering a 
state illegally or on a student or work visa is much easier for a potential terrorist than 
going through the refugee status determination process.275 Also, it is equally possible 
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that a terror attack is committed by a citizen of the state at risk, not by a migrant. 
Secondly, it increased the risk that somebody suspected of engaging in terrorism will 
be automatically excluded merely based on the UN Resolutions without an exact 
application of the exclusion clauses’ wording.276 And thirdly, there is again the 
possibility of politics influencing what are supposed to be legal and objective decisions. 
This is due to the political implications with regards to defining terrorism, as described 
above under chapter IV.B. and the problematic aspects of determining the necessary 
degree of association to a terrorist organization which will be discussed in the following 
section. 
C. Guilt by Association? 
The Security Certificate which had been issued against Suresh stated that, according to 
the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the LTTE is engaged in terrorist activity in 
Sri Lanka and operates in Canada under the cloak of the World Tamil Movement 
(WTM). Suresh is a member of these organizations and thus a threat to national 
security.277 In his defense, Suresh argued that he has only been engaged in fundraising 
activities and not involved in any actual terrorist acts.278 The questions arising from 
this are the following: Is Suresh’s mere membership sufficient to link him to the 
terrorist activities carried out by the LTTE and to identify him as a danger to Canada? 
And what degree of association to a terrorist organization is necessary to make an 
individual responsible for the terrorist acts of the group? 
When states opt for a too broad definition of who counts as engaging in terrorism, they 
might include individuals whose conduct is not even remotely dangerous or significant 
enough to justify being labelled a security threat. Hathaway gives striking examples 
that show the extreme level such an approach can reach. For example, the US Supreme 
Court stated that teaching the Kurdistan Workers’ Party how to submit a petition with 
the UN already counts as illegal support to a terroristic group. Citing Fullerton,279 he 
remarks that in line with this argument, even lending a bicycle to Nelson Mandela 
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would had been qualified as material support to a terror organization at the time the 
African National Congress was forbidden under the apartheid regime.280 Merely this 
loose association to organizations which are forbidden by their respective states, is 
considered sufficient proof for engaging in terrorism. This contradicts the principle that 
every refugee should receive an individual assessment concerning his/her refugee 
status or the denial of it, not an assessment based on acts committed by others. To avoid 
any arbitrary conduct in the refoulement process, it would had been necessary to 
evaluate Suresh’s individual behavior to see if he had intent to further the LTTE’s 
terrorist activities. However, regardless of how an evaluation of Suresh would end, 
whether he knowingly supported terrorist acts or not, the issue at hand is much bigger 
than Suresh.  
It is a general trend that states are widening the net for who qualifies as a terrorist. An 
example for this is the law on Providing Material Support to Terrorists in Title 18 of 
the US Code on Crimes and Criminal Procedure,281 that has been subject to significant 
changes over the past years. When it was first enacted in 1994, it outlawed the support 
of terrorists through directly providing them with weapons or money. However, it also 
included two exception: humanitarian assistance and support for the “nonviolent 
political, religious, philosophical, or ideological goals or beliefs of any person or 
group” were not forbidden under this law.282 If the supported organization engaged in 
terrorist and non-terrorist activities, then the prosecution had to prove that the 
defendant had the intent to support terrorism. This additional requirement and the 
exception for nonviolent activities were removed in an amendment in 1996. In 2001, 
the Patriot Act expanded the dragnet and added “expert advice or assistance” to the 
outlawed ways of supporting a terrorist group. It was unclear what conduct would 
exactly fall under this description. The case of Sami Omar Al-Hussayen’s was the first 
to be based on this provision and it shows how these types of laws further the risk of 
suspecting innocents of having ties to terror organizations.283 
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Al-Hussayen was a PhD student with Saudi Arabian citizenship who had been living 
in Idaho in the US for five years with his wife and three sons while completing his 
degree in computer studies.284 In 2004, he was accused of providing material support 
and resources to persons engaged in acts of terrorism and terrorist organizations and 
put to trial.285 Al-Hussayen had been volunteering as webmaster for the Islamic 
Assembly of North America which runs a website to aimed at spreading knowledge of 
Islam. As part of his work he set up links to different sources on Islam and 
contemporary political issues in connection to it.286 In the FBI’s theory, Al-Hussayen’s 
PhD studies were only a cover for his mission to raise money for terrorist 
organizations.287 In February 2003, hundreds of state officials stormed the campus at 
4am, arrested Al-Hussayen and questioned all other Arab students threatening them 
with withdrawal of their student visa if they did not cooperate.288 For seventeen months 
the defendant was locked up in a cell in solitary confinement while the FBI gathered 
further evidence to open a trial on terrorism-related charges, claiming that the website 
he had worked on encouraged financial contributions to terror organizations such as 
Hamas and Al Qaeda.289 The prosecution argued that the website in question had 
previously provided links to other websites asking for donations to organizations like 
Hamas and insisted that it was irrelevant whether the defendant intended to support 
terrorism or not. According to the amended material support law, this was a correct 
view. However, the jury decided that the prosecution provided no evidence to 
sufficiently substantiate the charges of material support.290  
In connection with the allegations against Al-Hussayen, the FBI arrested another 
suspect based on farfetched accusations: Abdullah Al-Kidd. Al-Kidd was born under 
the name Lavoni T. Kidd in Kansas as a US citizen (both his parents were US citizens 
too), attended the university of Idaho at the same time as Al-Hussayen and was a 
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successful football player for the university team. During his college time, he converted 
to Islam and changed his first name to fit his new religion. In 2003 he was granted a 
scholarship at a Saudi Arabian university to study Arabic and Islamic law but shortly 
before his departure he was arrested at the airport.291 The allegations against him were 
that he had met with other Arab students at the university who also knew Al-Hussayen, 
that he was involved in one financial transaction with Al-Hussayen and had been in 
touch with the Islamic charity for which Al-Hussayen had worked as a webmaster. As 
a matter of fact, Al-Kidd was never charged with any specific crime.292 Despite this, 
he was detained in a high-security prison for sixteen days where he was subjected to 
harsh treatment. “He was strip searched […] denied showers, denied visits by his 
family, and barely able to sleep under the bright lights that shone twenty-four hours a 
day.”293 The FBI justified his arrest by claiming the prosecution had planned to call 
him as a witness in the Al-Hussayen case but Al-Kidd was about to leave the country. 
What the agent missed to mention was that Al-Kidd had a wife and children in the US 
that he would have had returned to after his studies, he had never been informed that 
his journey to Saudi Arabia might cause any problems, and as he had cooperated with 
the FBI previously he would had been willing to stay in the US and voluntarily appear 
as a witness.294 It is more likely that Al-Kidd had been detained this way due to his 
suspected association with a terrorist organization merely based on his acquaintance 
with Al-Hussayen.  
From the point of view of the state, such a broad provision like the current form of the 
Material Support Law295 might be a desirable tool. Between 2001 and 2006 the material 
support charge was frequently used, and was the top charge in 162 federal prosecution 
cases.296 Not having to clearly prove an intent to support terrorism and being able to 
base charges on such a loose connection to terrorist activities, as seen in Al-Hussayen’s 
webmaster task, might help the prosecution to catch terrorists who could not be indicted 
otherwise. But at the same time, there is a high risk of innocent individuals being caught 
up in the net of being associated with terrorist organization. In the case of Al-Hussayen 
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he was lucky to have been acquitted by the jury. Nevertheless, he had been wrongly 
imprisoned for more than a year, his wife had to leave the US with the three children 
and return to Saudi Arabia due to immigration law issues based on the allegations 
against her husband, and ultimately Al-Hussayen also left the US without completing 
his PhD.297 Al-Kidd never got a trial to clear his name from the mark the arrest left on 
him. It was difficult to find a job due to being considered a criminal, he lost his 
university scholarship and suffered from medical problems as a result of these 
events.298 This is a high price these two men had to pay and shows how problematic a 
too broadly phrased law can be. It brings with it the risk of criminalizing individuals 
who are not associated with a terrorist organization. 
In Canada, the Anti-Terrorism Act, which was introduced shortly after the events of 
9/11, provided a tautological definition for a terrorist group and described it as an 
“entity that has as one of its purposes or activities facilitating or carrying out any 
terrorist activity.”299 Such a group does not even have to have committed a terrorist act 
by itself, being associated with an entity that has or will engage in terrorism is enough 
to be indictable. This extends criminal liability beyond personal conduct and 
knowledge and makes it possible to be guilty of terrorist charges for mere 
association.300 This brings with it the same difficulties and risks I have just described 
with regards to the US legislation on association with terrorist organizations. For 
practical purposes the Canadian government maintains a list of terrorist entities. The 
Federal Cabinet decides on which organization to include on the list whenever there 
are “reasonable grounds to believe that a) the entity has knowingly carried out, 
attempted to carry out, participated in or facilitated terrorist activity; or b) the entity is 
knowingly acting on behalf of, at the direction of or in association with an entity 
referred to in paragraph (a)”.301 Also in this context there is a risk of errors when a 
group is mistakenly put on the list. This can have severe consequences for the entity as 
it will be labelled as a terrorist organization and people will keep their distance from it 
out of fear of being associated with terrorism. There are not many safeguards in place 
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to prevent this from happening. The Cabinet decides on new entries to the list without 
any judicial supervision, and afterwards there are only limited grounds for a review in 
front of the Federal Court. A judge will decide based on the information which is 
available to him/her whether the adding an entity to the list is justified. It is problematic 
that the government does not have to disclose all the information it used for its 
determination.302 A number of organizations, among them charity or labor 
organizations for instance, have expressed their concern about ending up on the list 
undeservedly. Then they would have to invest a lot of money and time to fight in front 
of a court to be taken off again, after being publicly stigmatized as a terrorist entity.303  
Currently there are 53 organizations listed as terrorist groups with the earliest entries 
from the year 2002.304 It is interesting to note for the case of Suresh, that the LTTE was 
added to the list only in April 2006, four years after the Supreme Court decision. The 
World Tamil Movement was identified by the Federal Cabinet as a front organization 
of the LTTE, as raising funds on its behalf and as resorting to measures of intimidation 
and extortion to collect these funds. However, it was added to the list even later then 
the LTTE, namely in June 2008.305 This means that at the time Suresh was decided, in 
January 2002, the Anti-Terrorism Act was already in place but the LTTE and the WTM 
were far from being listed as one of the terrorist entities. It remains unclear why so 
many years passed after the Supreme Court, and the lower instances and immigration 
officials before it, declared those two organizations to be terrorist organizations. Maybe 
the evidence the Canadian Security Intelligence Service had against the WTM was not 
as strong as originally assumed. This weakens the argument that Suresh is a terrorist 
merely through to his membership to these groups. Especially as during the 
proceedings concerning the security certificate the immigration officer acknowledged 
that Suresh personally had not committed any violent acts in Canada or Sri Lanka.306 
When there is such a discrepancy, that an individual is a member of a terrorist 
organization or at least associated to it, but never engaged in any terrorist acts 
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him/herself, it raises the question whether mere membership or affiliation to a certain 
group is enough to presume that s/he poses a risk.307 We have seen in the cases of Al-
Kidd and Al-Hussayen that only relying on the association to a group, without 
considering the individual behavior, can be cause for wrongly stigmatizing somebody 
as terrorist. In order to take the different nuances of degree of association into account, 
it can be helpful to differentiate between three types of organizations: Firstly, the 
“typical” terrorist organization which has as its sole purpose to commit terrorist acts. 
Secondly, ancillary organizations, that act in association with the previous category of 
organizations and indirectly assist in terrorist acts. And thirdly, so-called dual purpose 
organizations which 
 in addition to illegal activities also follow legitimate purposes.308 When somebody is 
a member of the first group, which without a doubt commits terrorist acts to achieve its 
goals, then it is clear that the individual is engaging in terrorism, regardless of whether 
s/he is actively involved in the act or just passively supporting it through the 
membership.309 With the other two categories things are more complex. It is possible 
that these groups have sub-division that follow civil purposes and are not engaged in 
any terrorist activities. If for example a teacher decides to work for a school run by a 
charity organization associated with a terrorist entity, or if a dual-purpose group has a 
sub-division running hospitals and a doctor decides to work there as a volunteer to help 
the poor, then these people cannot automatically be regarded as terrorists. To avoid any 
mistakes from happening, mere association should not suffice as proof but additional 
evidence concerning the individual behavior and intent and knowledge of the suspect 
should be required to determine whether s/he is engaging in terrorist activities.    
The above examples made clear why states should avoid legislation which makes it 
possible to accuse almost anyone of having ties to terrorist association. Using laws 
which disregard the different degrees of association to an organization, but 
automatically declare somebody guilty by association, are prone to lead to 
misjudgments. They lead to situations where a simple act like buying something at a 
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charity bazaar to support a suppressed minority in a certain country could suddenly 
qualify as terrorism, if the organization behind the bazaar has ties to a group using 
violence in that struggle abroad. This causes a very high level of legal uncertainty and 
makes it impossible for citizens to foresee which acts could possibly bring them in 
connection with terrorism. Introducing more detailed guidelines on how to evaluate 
different degrees of association and to require thorough evidence on the individual’s 
role with regards to the terrorist entity or his/her intent, can help to avoid wrong 
accusations. In addition, it will not only protect innocents but with the additional 
evidence requirements it will also be possible to clearly identify those who are really 
involved in terrorist attacks. Therefore, creating laws which are less broad and do not 
rely on vague terms, does not stand in the way of combatting security threats but 
actually improves the safety of a state’s citizens.  
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V. Alternative Ways of Protecting Security Interests 
As seen in the previous chapters, some states consider refoulement the ideal way of 
dealing with a security threat. They focus only on Article 33(2) of the Refugee 
Convention and their corresponding domestic legislation to justify this measure even 
in cases where refugees would be refouled to a risk of torture. However, Article 5 of 
the Refugee Convention states that “nothing in this Convention shall be deemed to 
impair any rights and benefits granted by a Contracting State to refugees apart from 
this Convention.” This confirms that states have to consider their obligations under 
international human rights treaties when dealing with this issue. For example, Article 
3 of the CAT, Article 3 of the ECHR, or Article 7 of the ICCPR all clearly forbid states 
to refoule somebody to a risk of torture.310 I argued in chapter three that all states are 
bound by the absolute prohibition of torture and the principle of non-refoulement to 
torture due to it being a norm of ius cogens. Therefore, refouling any person to torture 
in order to protect national security interests is not a legal option to address security 
threats, even if there is no alternative available to address the security issue. 
However, when a refugee is suspected of being a security threat, there is an alternative 
to refoulement to torture: domestic prosecution. For example, the fundraising activities 
of Suresh could have fallen under the International Convention for the Suppression of 
the Financing of Terrorism,311 which under its Article 4 obliges States Parties to create 
corresponding criminal offences under its domestic law.312 Canada is a State Party to 
this Convention and could have prosecuted Suresh under the corresponding domestic 
provision in its criminal law. If found guilty, he would had received a prison sentence 
and would no longer be a threat to national security. This way the state protects its 
security interests without violating its human rights obligations. Even though the Court 
in Suresh regarded refoulement to torture as the right solution to ensure that Canada 
does not become a safe haven for terrorists, this does not automatically mean that it is 
the only option to protect the state.313 When it comes to nationals being suspected of 
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terrorist acts, a domestic trial and imprisonment are considered sufficient to neutralize 
the threat they are posing. In these cases, the defendant will receive an appropriate 
sentence according to national criminal law, depending on the seriousness of the crime 
and this is accepted as protecting a country’s population from any security threats. Why 
should this not apply to refugees too? 
States will argue that it is possible to differentiate between residents of a state based on 
their nationality, especially with regards to expulsion. States have the right to decide 
freely over who they grant entry into their territory as part of their sovereignty, thus 
they can deport aliens in accordance with their national laws.314 Citizens, on the other 
hand, benefit from their right not to be expelled from their country of nationality, even 
if they committed a crime. Therefore, domestic prosecution is the only possible option 
to combat terrorist threats emanating from nationals.315 This distinction between 
citizens and non-citizens is in accordance with international law. For example, the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
forbids all types of racial discrimination “based on race, colour, descent, or national or 
ethnic origin”.316 However, Article 1(2) clearly states that the Convention does not 
apply to distinctions made between citizens and non-citizens.317 Also, Article 13 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights318 allows for the expulsion of 
aliens lawfully in the country out of reasons of national security. Therefore, it is legal 
for states to deport foreigners to their country of origin if they have committed a crime 
or are considered to be inadmissible for other reasons. However, in cases of 
refoulement to torture the situation is different. Those refugees lost the protection of 
their country of origin and will not receive a fair trial for their crimes there, instead 
they face the risk of torture. In this context, the absolute prohibition of torture restricts 
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a state’s right to deport a non-citizen as it is a non-derogable norm. The only way to 
contain the security threat without violating this ius cogens provision is to try the 
suspect domestically. 
There are several arguments in favor of opting for domestic prosecution. Firstly, opting 
for the domestic prosecution of a refugee suspected of terrorism does not cause any 
disadvantage or additional risk to the state but helps to contain a possible threat. Okafor 
and Okoronkwo illustrate accurately how arbitrary the differentiation based on 
citizenship is. Let us assume that a Sri Lankan married couple comes to Canada to 
study for a few years. During their stay, a son is born who receives Canadian 
citizenship. Shortly afterwards they return to live in Sri Lanka and have a daughter. 
Many years later the family returns to Canada as refugees but the two grown up children 
had engaged in activities with the LTTE and are therefore regarded as a security threat 
to Canada. The Suresh exception allows for the daughter to be refouled even if she 
faces torture upon return. Her brother will under all circumstances remain in Canada 
even if he would pose a much higher risk to the state than her.319 This formalist way of 
differentiating between them based on citizenship not on the seriousness of risk does 
not contribute to protecting Canada’s security. 
Secondly, we could draw an analogy from the principle of aut dedere aut judicare, 
which states that when extradition (or in this case, refoulement) is not an option, then 
domestic prosecution is the right path to follow. The expression aut dedere aut judicare 
was coined by the famous international law scholar Hugo Grotius, though he used a 
slightly different phrasing.320 Dedere refers to the practice of surrendering or 
extraditing an individual, while judicare is the stem form of the word adjudicate which 
in this context means to prosecute. This principle is commonly used and incorporated 
in over 70 international criminal law conventions.321 It is aimed at “securing 
international cooperation in the suppression of certain kinds of criminal conduct.322 It 
obliges states to either extradite an offender if asked for this, or in case they refuse to 
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do so, to prosecute him/her in front of the competent court.323 There is disagreement 
over to what extent this rule has become customary international law, and whether it 
includes only the most heinous crimes such as crimes against humanity or genocide, or 
applies to all international offenses.324 It is unnecessary for the purpose of my thesis to 
elaborate on this debate. All the treaties concerning the suppression of terrorism include 
a provision resembling the following: “The State Party in the territory of which the 
alleged offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without 
exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to 
submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.”325 This 
clearly refers to the principle of aut dedere aut judicare. 
The reason behind this principle of either extradite or prosecute, is the common interest 
states have to suppress all forms of crime. One could also describe it as a moral and 
social order that all states want to achieve, and in order to do so they follow this 
principle.326 Usually aut dedere aut judicare is applied when a state refuses to extradite 
an individual to ensure the person will not go unpunished. In the incidents of 
refoulement to torture, on the other hand, it is a slightly different situation. The state 
actually wants to deport a refugee and intends to leave it to the state of origin how to 
deal with the alleged terrorist. However, this is forbidden under international law due 
to the absolute prohibition of torture. Aut dedere aut judicare shows us two possible 
ways of how to deal with a suspected terrorist. When leaving the prosecution to another 
state is not an option, then the state needs to domestically prosecute the individual. This 
way a potential criminal does not go unpunished and the security threat will be 
neutralized. 
Thirdly, domestic prosecution is at the moment the only possibility to ensure the 
suspected terrorist will not go unpunished while still ensuring his/her human rights will 
not be infringed. It would be desirable to prosecute terrorists on an international level 
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under one uniform criminal law to ensure they will receive the same fair treatment 
during the trial regardless of where in the world they were detained. Due to the cross-
border character of terrorism, some authors suggest to expand the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court to include acts of terrorism,327 or even propose the 
establishment of an International Court for the Prosecution of Global Terrorists.328 
These are laudable propositions but unlikely to be realized due to the lack of consensus 
within the international community on a definition of terrorism. As there is no 
international court which could undertake the prosecution, it has to be done on a 
domestic level. Refouling the refugee to the country of origin is not an option because 
it would mean a violation of the absolute prohibition of torture, therefore it is left to the 
country of refuge to deal with the threat.  
Once the state has opted for conducting a domestic trial, the court examines the 
evidence brought against the suspected terrorist and decides whether he is guilty of any 
crime or not. In case of a conviction s/he will receive the same sentence as a citizen 
depending on the severity of the crime. It is very important that during this process 
states abide by the requirements of due process even for non-nationals. Unfortunately, 
this does not always happen. For example, after the attacks of 9/11, the US applied 
much lesser standards on trials of aliens. Those foreigners accused of terrorist crimes 
would be tried in front of military tribunals or simply interrogated, detained and 
deported under immigration law.329 The general public in many states often accepts or 
at least does not question when aliens do not get the same rights as nationals and 
considers treating them differently legitimate for security purposes. For instance, Dick 
Cheney, former Vice-President of the United States, stated that aliens threatening to 
kill innocent Americans “don’t deserve the same guarantees and safeguards that would 
be used for an American citizen”.330 This is incorrect from a legal point of view. For 
the most part, human rights apply to citizens and non-citizens equally. Constitutions 
often reserve certain rights only to nationals, but these usually concern the political 
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participation such as the right to vote or to run for an office. All other rights apply to 
citizens and non-citizens alike. For example, as stated in chapter III.A.1, the Canadian 
Charter applies to everyone, nationals and foreigners, to the same extent.331 Also the 
US constitution grants most of its rights regardless of nationality. In the context of 
domestic prosecution of terrorists, it is important that, for instance, “the right to a public 
trial, a trial by jury, the assistance of a lawyer, and the right to confront adverse 
witnesses” apply to refugees.332 Unfortunately, these rights are not always complied 
with.  
When it comes to alleged terrorists, the United States and other countries tend to resort 
to harsh measures which constitute human rights violations. Extraordinary rendition 
became a popular practice after the attacks of 9/11, as well as the indeterminate 
detainment of suspects in camps like Guantanamo Bay or Abu Ghraib.333 The list of 
human rights violations taking place in these camps is long. During the interrogation 
of the detainees, illegal methods were used, such as waterboarding and other abusive 
and degrading treatment.334 The US claimed that these acts were justified until the so-
called ‘War on Terror’ ended.335 To combat security threats, it violated fundamental 
human rights. Most worrying of all, many individuals were found innocent in the end. 
They were wrongly detained for several years based on incorrect evidence,336 raising 
speculation about how many other cases of miscarriage of justice may have gone 
undetected. It is essential that domestic prosecution of refugees involved in terrorist 
activities observes international human rights law and abides by the requirements of 
due process. Otherwise, it ceases to be a legitimate alternative to refoulement to torture. 
When conducted with due process, domestic prosecution is the best solution to avert 
security threats. 
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VI. Conclusion 
The Suresh exception is not a helpful legal tool to navigate the complex security and 
protection challenges in the post 9/11 era and indeed has the potential to create 
additional legal and protection problems. It includes many flaws that are a reflection of 
the era of political turmoil in which the decision took place. In a time when the focus 
of states is on anti-terrorism measures, not on the protection of human rights, the 
Canadian Supreme Court valued security interests higher than non-refoulement to 
torture. In face of the absolute prohibition of torture there is no room for a balancing 
process, and allowing for refoulement to torture under exceptional circumstances 
violates Canada’s obligations under Article 3 of the CAT. The Suresh exception is 
setting a negative precedent. Other states try to rely on it in order to justify refoulement 
to torture, a conduct which further erodes the prohibition of torture, and undermines 
international human rights law globally. The European Court of Human Rights was so 
far successful in preventing the Suresh exception from gaining ground, at least 
regionally on the territory of the States Parties to the ECHR. However, governments 
continue to find ways around the non-refoulement rule, for example through 
concluding a Memorandum of Understanding with the migrant’s country of origin 
guaranteeing s/he will not be subjected to torture. This is a troubling trend eroding 
human rights.  
It is particularly concerning that Suresh takes place in a context where states are willing 
to sacrifice fundamental human rights for the sake of national security. Refoulement to 
torture and extraordinary rendition show how measures taken in the name of security 
can get out of hand and cross the border into illegality. These drastic infringements of 
human rights are built on the idea that threat to national security can justify any 
violations. The weakness of this argument lies in the indeterminacy of what constitutes 
such a threat. The international community has no uniform definition of terrorism and 
the political agenda of individual states stands in the way of remedying this deficiency. 
The vagueness of this term makes it susceptible to political manipulation for 
stigmatizing opponents and renders it unfit as a legal basis for the possibility of 
refoulement to torture. States tend to interpret all terrorism-related terms widely, for 
example by considering an indirect threat to the country of refuge as sufficient to 
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constitute a security threat. This goes against the purpose of Article 33(2) of the 
Refugee Convention which asks for a direct negative impact to national security to 
trigger the exception to non-refoulement. States also go too far in their interpretation 
when they consider a loose association to a terrorist entity enough to declare a person 
guilty of engaging in terrorism. The constant widening of the dragnet of who is 
considered to be a terrorist threat ultimately undermines human rights law, it opens the 
door for political misuse and heightens the risk of miscarriage of justice. To avoid the 
violation of the absolute prohibition of torture and the inherent risks presented by an 
undefined or vaguely defined concept of terrorism, courts should quash the possibility 
of refoulement to torture, as advanced in the Suresh exception, and instead rely on an 
alternative: domestic prosecution to determine whether somebody poses a security 
threat and in case of a guilty verdict imprisonment to contain the security threat. 
 
  
